

April 14, 2009

DRC BOARD MEETING

**Department of
Environmental Quality
168 North 1950 West
DEQ BLDG #2
CONF ROOM 101
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
84114-4850
3:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.**

RADIATION CONTROL BOARD
Department of Environmental Quality (Bldg #2),
Conference Room 101, 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah
3:00 – 5:00 PM, April 14, 2009

FINAL AGENDA

- I. Minutes (**Board Action Item**)
 - a. Approval of the Minutes from the March 10, 2009 Board Meeting

- II. Rules
No Items

- III. Radioactive Materials Licensing/Inspection
No Items

- IV. X-Ray Registration/Inspection (**Board Action Item**)
 - a. Approval to Distribute Letter: "Raising Awareness of X-Ray Exposure to Patients"

- V. Radioactive Waste (**Board Information Item**)
 - a. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Plan for Rulemaking for Disposal of Depleted Uranium

- VI. Uranium Mill Licensing and Inspection
No Items

- VII. Other Division Issues
 - a. Introduction of New Board Member: Colleen Johnson
(Board Information Item)
 - b. Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for the Period 7/1/09 thru 6/30/10
(Board Action Item)
 - c. Subcommittee Recommendations for Routine Reporting from the Division
(Board Action Item)

- VIII. Public Comment

- IX. **The Next Scheduled Board Meeting: May 12, 2009 (Tuesday)**, DEQ Bldg #2, Conference Room 101, 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 3:00 – 5:00 P.M.

For those individuals needing special assistance in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, please contact Brooke Baker at the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, at 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, Office of Human Resources at (801) 536-4412, TDD (801) 536-4414, or by email at: bbaker@utah.gov.

UTAH RADIATION BOARD

BOARD MEMBERS - SIGN-IN SHEET

MEETING DATE: April 14, 2009

Peter A Jenkins, M.S., CHP, Chair 

Elizabeth Goryunova, M.S., Vice Chair 

William S. Sinclair
Richard W. Sprott, Executive Director DEQ  attended


Dane L. Finerfrock, Exec. Sec.  attended

Scott Bird  Absent

Patrick D. Cone  Absent


Frank D. DeRosso, MSPH, CIH 

Christian K. Gardner 


Colleen Johnson  Absent

Edd Johnson 

Dr. Douglas Kimball 

Joseph K. Miner, M.D., MSPH 

John W. Thomson, M.D. 

Dr. David Tripp 

OTHER STAFF ATTENDING

Public Attendance Sheet
Utah Radiation Control
Board Meeting
 DEQ Bldg. #2, Conf. Room 101
 168 N 1950 W, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4850
 2:00 – 4:00 p.m.
 April 14, 2009
Please Print

NAME (Please Print)	Organization/Affiliation Phone Number and Email Address:	Speak: Yes or No? If Yes, which Agenda Item Do you Wish to Address Before the Board Today? (List Item#)
1. James O'Neal	Private citizen 801-802-0228 iscenychia@yahoo.com	yes - V
2. Vincent Prince	HEAR Utah	
3. Dan Shrum	Energy Solutions	No
4. Christopher Thomas	HEAR Utah	Maybe - V
5. Mark LeDoux	Energy Solutions	NO
6. JIM SWEET	Gamma West	NO
7. James Holzkamp	Holladay & Hart	No
8.		
9.		
10.		
11.		
12.		
13.		
14.		
15.		
16.		
17.		
18.		
19.		

Public Attendance Sheet
Utah Radiation Control
Board Meeting
 DEQ Bldg. #2, Conf. Room 101
 168 N 1950 W, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4850
 2:00 – 4:00 p.m.
April 14, 2009
Please Print

NAME (Please Print)	Organization/Affiliation: Phone Number and Email Address:	Speak: Yes or No? If Yes, which Agenda Item Do you Wish to Address Before the Board Today? (List Item#)
20. Susan Giddings	StG (DEQ) DRG	no
21. Candice Fitches	ENVST UofU	NO
22.		
23.		
24.		
25.		
26.		
27.		
28.		
29.		
30.		
31.		
32.		
33.		
34.		
35.		
36.		
37.		
38.		

RADIATION CONTROL BOARD
Department of Environmental Quality (Bldg #2 - DRC BOARD PACKETS TO MAIL OUT)
Conference Room 101, 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah
3:00 – 5:00 PM, April 14, 2009

TENTATIVE AGENDA

- I. Minutes (**Board Action Item**)
 - a. Approval of the Minutes from the March 10, 2009 Board Meeting
- II. Rules
No Items
- III. Radioactive Materials Licensing/Inspection
No Items
- IV. X-Ray Registration/Inspection (**Board Action Item**)
 - a. Approval to distribute letter: "Raising Awareness of X-Ray Exposure to Patients."
- V. Radioactive Waste (**Board Information Item**)
 - a. Nuclear Regulatory Commission plan for rulemaking for disposal of Depleted Uranium
- VI. Uranium Mill Licensing and Inspection
No Items
- VII. Other Division Issues
 - a. Introduction of new Board Member: Colleen Johnson
(**Board Information Item**)
 - b. Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for the period 7/1/09 thru 6/30/10
(**Board Action Item**)
- VIII. Public Comment
- IX. **The Next Scheduled Board Meeting: May 12, 2009 (Tuesday)**, DEQ Bldg #2, Conference Room 101, 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 3:00 – 5:00 P.M.

For those individuals needing special assistance in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, please contact Brooke Baker at the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, at 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, Office of Human Resources at (801) 536-4412, TDD (801) 536-4414, or by email at: bbaker@utah.gov.

- I. Minutes (Board Action Item)**
 - a. Approval of the Minutes from the March 10, 2009 Board Meeting**

- I. Minutes (**Board Action Item**) *March 10, 2009*
- a. Approval of Minutes from the ~~August 1, 2008,~~
Board Meeting

MINUTES
OF
THE UTAH RADIATION CONTROL BOARD

March 10, 2009

Department of Environmental Quality, DEQ Building #2

Conference Room 101

168 N 1950 W

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4850

BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT

Peter A. Jenkins, M.S., CHP, Chair
Elizabeth Goryunova, M.S., Vice Chair
Dane L. Finerfrock, Executive Secretary
Scott Bird
Patrick D. Cone
Frank D. DeRosso, MSPH, CIH
Christian K. Gardner
Edd C. Johnson
Douglas S. Kimball, DMD
Joseph K. Miner, M.D., MSPH
William J. Sinclair, Acting Executive Director
John W. Thomson, M.D.
David A. Tripp, Ph.D.

BOARD MEMBERS ABSENT/EXCUSED

No Board Members Absent

DRC STAFF/OTHER DEQ MEMBERS

PRESENT

Edith Barker, DRC Staff
Kevin Carney, DRC Staff
Phil Goble, DRC Staff
David Hogge, DRC Staff
John Hultquist, Section Manager
Boyd Imai, DRC Staff
Ryan Johnson, DRC Staff
Craig Jones, Section Manager
Laura Lockhart, Attorney General's Office
Loren Morton, Section Manager

Yoli Necochea, DRC Staff
Fred Nelson, Attorney General's Office

DRC STAFF/OTHER DEQ MEMBERS

PRESENT- CON'T

Sonja Robinson, DRC Staff
Dave Rupp, DRC Staff
Donna Spangler, PPL

PUBLIC

Judy Fahys, Salt Lake Tribune
Charles Judd, Cedar Mountain
Environmental, Inc.
Shaun McCandless, EnergySolutions
Stephen T. Nelson, BYU
Vanessa Pierce, HEAL-UT
Treesa Parker, EnergySolutions
Dan Shrum, EnergySolutions
Christopher Thomas, HEAL-UT

GREETINGS/MEETING CALLED TO ORDER

The Utah Radiation Control Board convened in the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), Conference Room 101, 168 North 1950 West, DEQ Bldg. 2, Salt Lake City, Utah. Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, called the meeting to order at 3:00 p.m. He welcomed the Board Members and the public. Chairman Jenkins indicated that if the public wished to address any items on the agenda, they should sign the public sign-in sheet. Those desiring to comment would be given an opportunity to address their concerns during the comment period.

I. APPROVAL OF MINUTES (Board Action Item)

a. Approval of the Minutes from the February 10, 2009 Board Meeting

Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, asked the Board members for corrections to the minutes from February 10, 2009. There were no corrections to the minutes.

**MOTION MADE BY EDD C. JOHNSON TO APPROVE THE
THE MINUTES OF FEBRUARY 10, 2009**

MOTION SECONDED BY DAVID A. TRIPP

MOTION CARRIED AND PASSED UNANIMOUSLY

II. RULES

No Items

III. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LICENSING/INSPECTION

No Items

IV. X-RAY REGISTRATION/INSPECTIONS

No Items

V. RADIOACTIVE WASTE

a. Approval of the "Order" Regarding the Cedar Mountain Environmental Inc./Charles Judd Petition to Intervene (Board Action Item)

Fred Nelson, Esq., informed the Board on this item. He asked the Board to recall that at the Board meeting on January 13, 2009 the Board had considered the "Petition to Intervene" by Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc. (CME)/Charles Judd, and a "Motion to Dismiss" by EnergySolutions. Mr. Nelson said that the Board had made a decision to "Dismiss," and he had gone through the transcript record and prepared an Order. He said the process that he used to prepare the Order was that he took information that was provided by both CME/Charles Judd, as well as EnergySolutions. He then listened to what they suggested and drafted what he considered to be

an appropriate Order based on the comments that were made at the January 13, 2009 Board Meeting and the information that was presented. He said he distributed the Final Draft to both parties. Mr. Nelson said that the Draft was acceptable to *EnergySolutions*, but it was also the reason they disagreed with the decision. Lewis Francis Esq., CME/Charles Judd's council, said that he did not have any comments and would not be at the Board meeting to object to the Order.

Mr. Nelson said that if the Draft Order was acceptable to the Board that they could enter it as the Final Written Order. And if the Board entered the Order today, March 10, 2009, it would be subject to the Appeal Provision of the Administrative Procedures Act (listed at the end of the document). The parties have a right to petition for a review or a reconsideration of the appeal within 20 days. He said that he did not expect this to happen, although this was an option for the parties. In addition, within 30-days, if one of the parties decided they wanted to appeal it to the courts, they could do this. Mr. Nelson recommended that the Board approve the Order as it had been written.

MOTION MADE BY WILLIAM J. SINCLAIR TO APPROVE THE ORDER, AND THAT THE BOARD ENTER THE ORDER AS A FINAL WRITTEN ORDER

SECONDED BY ELIZABETH GORYUNOVA

MOTION CARRIED AND PASSED UNANIMOUSLY

b. Update on the Summary Judgment Hearing: *EnergySolutions* – Northwest Interstate Compact (Board Information Item)

Fred Nelson, Esq., informed the Board that the Executive Secretary had asked him to update the Board on the lawsuit that *EnergySolutions* had filed against the Northwest Interstate Compact (NWIC). Mr. Nelson asked the Board to recall that the lawsuit involved a challenge to the authority of the Northwest Interstate Compact over *EnergySolutions*. The Governor requested that the State of Utah intervene and present a position, which the Attorney General's Office did. Mr. Nelson said the briefing took place over the last several months. He said that there were approximately 150 pages of briefing on count one. He said there were three counts: (1) the first count was whether or not the Northwest Interstate Compact had jurisdiction over *EnergySolutions*; (2) the second count was whether or not the NWIC's authority was preempted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) and the third count was whether or not it was a violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause for Utah to prohibit the Italian waste from coming to *EnergySolutions*.

A Summary Judgment was requested by *EnergySolutions*, the State of

Utah and the Northwest Interstate Compact for count one. Mr. Nelson said the Judge scheduled two and half hours of argument and discussion. This occurred over a couple of weeks ago. There has not been a judgment yet, but Mr. Nelson said that he anticipates that the Judge would be issuing a decision soon.

Questions by the Board:

The Board had additional questions for Fred Nelson, Esq. Some of the concerns were: (1) what would happen, if the Judge were to rule that the Northwest Interstate Compact had no authority over *EnergySolutions*; (2) would the State of Utah leave the Northwest Interstate Compact Lawsuit; and (3) what would happen, if the Judge ruled in favor of counts two and three in the lawsuit.

Fred Nelson responded to the questions in the order that they were asked:

- (1) The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has delegated its licensing authority for low-level waste disposal to the State of Utah. The State of Utah is an Agreement State. This gives the authority to the State of Utah and the oversight to NRC in regulating and licensing low-level waste facilities.
- (2) Mr. Nelson responded that leaving the lawsuit would be the legislature's and the Governor's decision. In addition, if the Judge ruled that the Northwest Interstate Compact did not have authority over *EnergySolutions*, it would not mean that the State of Utah would end its partnership with the Northwest Interstate Compact.
- (3) Mr. Nelson informed the Board that the State of Utah filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on counts two and three. He said that it was the State's position that if the Judge ruled against the State of Utah on count one, this would decide the lawsuit. If the Judge ruled that the NWIC did not have jurisdiction over *EnergySolutions*, then *EnergySolutions* would need a judicial decision on count two (NRC's preemptive authority) and count three (the Interstate Commerce Clause).

c. Briefing: Financial Assurance Requirements for Radioactive Material Licensees (Board Information Item)

Peter A. Jenkins, Chairman, informed the Board that he had asked the Division to report on "Financial Assurance." Chairman Jenkins asked the Board to recall that at a previous meeting the Board had questions regarding issues that were raised on the "Petition to Intervene," (specifics

dealing with the quantity and cost calculations for decommissioning; the needed rock material; and the site's disposal capacity). The Board would also hear other information items.

Chairman Jenkins informed the Board that the information would be presented in two parts. The first part entitled "Financial Assurance Requirements for Radioactive Material Licensees" would be presented by Craig Jones, Manager. The second part entitled "Financial Assurance Requirements for Uranium Mills and EnergySolutions" would be presented by Loren Morton, Manager.

Please refer to the attached power point presentation.

After the presentation, Craig Jones and Loren Morton, Section Managers, answered questions. Mr. Jones answered the Board's questions regarding: (1) Escrow Agreements; (2) Surety Bonds; and (3) Third Party Decommission. Mr. Morton answered questions regarding: (1) comparison of surety amounts from 2007 to 2008; (2) who paid for the Surety Report; (3) did EnergySolutions provide financial assistance to DRC; and (4) was there enough rock volume and the direct cost for coverage of construction material for closure/decommission at EnergySolutions.

Mr. Morton also directed his response regarding the rock volume at EnergySolutions to Mr. Judd, because it was one of Mr. Judd's concerns. Mr. Morton said he wanted the following on record: after looking at the geologic deposit at the North Community Pit, the DRC, PEPG Engineering, and the Bureau of Land Management had concluded that there was certainly enough rock material and adequate characteristics for site closure.

VI. URANIUM MILL TAILINGS UPDATE

No Items

VII. OTHER DIVISION ISSUES (Board Action Item)

a. Discussion: Routine Reporting of DRC Activities to the Board (Board Action Item)

Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, asked the Members to recall that a few weeks ago he had sent out some information on Routine Reporting. Chairman Jenkins reminded the Board that this was a Board Action Item that he wanted them to consider. He explained that several times he had

requested from Board Members ideas or questions that they would like to hear as Board Information Items (like Financial Assurance Requirements). He said that one of the Board Members had proposed that the Board have routine reporting by Division Staff on a regular basis. The Chairman felt that Routine Reporting would be a significant change from anything that had been requested by previous Boards.

After much discussion, the Board decided they would like to have the Routine Reporting in a written format. The Chairman suggested that the Board form a Working Committee to decide what issues they would like to receive in the written reports. He called for a vote from the Board for approval of the Routine Reporting and for the formation of a Working Committee.

MOTION MADE BY PETER A. JENKINS THAT THE BOARD FORM A WORKING COMMITTEE TO DECIDE HOW OFTEN AND WHAT TOPICS THE BOARD WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN THE WRITTEN REPORTING OF DIVISION ACTIVITIES

MOTION CARRIED AND PASSED UNIAMOUSLY

After receiving advice from counsel, Chairman Jenkins decided that the Working Committee should involve five Board Members. The following Board Members volunteered to be on the committee: (1) Scott Bird, (2) Patrick D. Cone, (3) Elizabeth Goryunova, (4) David A. Tripp, and (5) William J. Sinclair.

The Board asked Elizabeth Goryunova, Vice Chairwoman, to be in charge of scheduling the Working Committee Meetings. Dane Finerfrock, Executive Secretary, said that Staff would arrange the scheduling of the conference room, once he received the dates for each meeting that would be held.

VIII. PUBLIC COMMENT

Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, informed the Board and the public that in the interest of some of the anticipated comments, he wished to make an announcement. He said that the Board had a policy that each member of the public would be welcome to address the Board. He cautioned that time would be limited due to the long presentations.

Chairman Jenkins said that he had received calls from members of the public who wanted to address the Board on subjects that were outside of the agenda-- he said that today the agenda was full and time was limited. He said if a

member of the public wanted to have an issue on the agenda at a Board Meeting, they would need to give the Division two weeks prior notice. In addition, he said if someone from the public needed more time to address the Board, they could contact the Executive Secretary, Dane Finerfrock, to get an issue on the agenda. Chairman Jenkins called the "walk in comments" that were intended to cover the topics on the agenda.

Stephen T. Nelson, Brigham Young University (BYU):

Stephen T. Nelson, BYU, said that he recommended that Board Members insisted on getting information from DRC Staff whenever they requested it--even if that meant an issue would end up in an Administrative Hearing. Mr. Nelson said that Board members needed to be trusted to deal with issues in a fair manner. He asked how a member of the public would go about searching or requesting DRC documents electronically.

Dane Finerfrock, Executive Secretary, explained that a rule was approved at the April 4, 2008 Board Meeting (Rule 313-12-111, "Submission of Electronic Copies"). The rule had, had a rough start. Mr. Finerfrock explained that the intent of the rule was for all documents submitted to DRC to be scanned and to be reproducible and searchable electronically. Mr. Finerfrock explained that this was not currently the case. However, he said all uranium mill and disposal facility documents received from regulated facilities and all documents produced by the DRC staff were available on DRC's website.

Mr. Finerfrock said that currently there were restrictions that made some documents have limited availability, since similar programs to view the documents electronically may not be available to both the public and the State. In addition, some businesses were submitting documents that were not scanable, searchable, or reproducible. Because of this, the Division has requested that the documents be resubmitted--success has been limited.

Mr. Finerfrock said that currently the information on the Division's website was priority information that held more interest to the public; for example, information regarding the Uranium Mills and Low-Level Radioactive Waste. He said that eventually there would be all kinds of information on licenses and registrants that could be made available to the public. He said that the goal for the Division was to make as many Division documents accessible and available to the public as soon as possible--and to as many computer programs as possible.

William J. Sinclair, Acting Executive Director, responded that trying to get an electronic format that worked for the Department, DEQ, and the public, and converting all previously-submitted documents was a Department wide

initiative. He said that all paper documents had to be scanned or had to be resubmitted electronically--he said this task was even more challenging when DEQ was going through massive budget cuts. He said this was the ultimate goal of DEQ to have electronic documents established and to make them readily available to the public.

Stephen T. Nelson, BYU, recommend to the Division, Department and Board that they make the final formatting for accessing Division documents and make them available and searchable to the public. He said that when accomplished electrons could replace paper.

Vanessa Pierce, Executive Director for HEAL-Utah

Vanessa Pierce asked the Board to consider weighing-in on some of Stephen Cramer's comments that were recently made to the public regarding the nature of disposed radioactive-waste at EnergySolutions. She said Stephen Cramer, CEO of EnergySolutions, made a comment to the media "that in 100 years you could build homes and grow potatoes at EnergySolutions." Ms. Pierce said that she thought that it was important that members of the Board, policy makers, legislatures, and the public have an accurate and correct understanding of the nature of the waste at EnergySolutions. Ms. Pierce also had a list of concerns that she read to the Board, and that she wanted the Board to address.

Vanessa Pierce handed out a couple of handouts to the Board: (1) the "Deseret Morning News" comments from Stephen Cramer published on February 22, 2009 and (2) a list of questions and concerns HEAL-Utah had regarding EnergySolutions.

The Board members discussed the nature of the comments that Mr. Cramer made to the media. Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, said that he felt uncomfortable with the Board taking a position on comments made by licensees to the media. He thought this would be a slippery slope for the Board. He said statements made to the Board or to Division Staff were a different story. He said in the Board's role in over-site and as a technical body, it could demand a level of technical accuracy from comments made to the Board.

Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, said that the comments and questions that Ms. Pierce submitted would be valuable as future Board Information Items. He said they could be included among the other Division reporting topics that have been requested by Board Members.

Chairman Jenkins asked for advice from Counsel, Fred Nelson. Mr. Nelson advised the Chair and the Board that taking action on these kinds of issues was a question of policy. He told the Board that they had the authority to exercise

and issue policy statements and to make policy decisions. As to the list of questions brought by HEAL-Utah, Counsel said that he agreed with the Chair, and these could be addressed by DRC Staff. He said that if the Board wanted to make a public statement that it was within the Board's decision making authority to do it, and it was certainly within the context of Board Policy.

Charles Judd, Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc.

Charles Judd, Cedar Mountain Environmental Inc., said that he appreciated the report that was given by the Division on "Financial Assurance." He said that it was unfortunate that this report was not available to him for public comment and during the EnergySolutions license renewal process. Mr. Judd said that every year when the issue of "Financial Assurance" came up, he would have liked the public to have the opportunity to make comments. Mr. Judd said that many of the questions that he had a couple of years ago were answered during Mr. Morton's presentation. Mr. Judd said that he still had additional questions. In conclusion, Mr. Judd said that he would address his additional comments, concerns, and suggestions to Dane Finerfrock, if this was acceptable to the Board.

Peter A. Jenkins, Chair, responded to Mr. Judd that this was acceptable and to address his written concerns to the Executive Secretary, Dane Finerfrock.

- IX. The Next Scheduled Board Meeting: April 14, 2009 (Tuesday), DEQ Bldg #2, Conference Room 101, 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 3:00 – 5:00 P.M.**

THE BOARD MEETING ADJOURNED AT 5:12 P.M.

Financial Assurance

Utah Radiation Control
Board Meeting

March 10, 2009

General

- Purpose:
 - Ensure ability to decommission Licensed facility in event Licensee unwilling / unable to complete site closure.

General

- Definition of Decommissioning:
 - Remove facility / site from service.
 - Includes:
 - Facility / Site – decontamination, removal from service, dismantlement and/or completion of site closure.
 - Reduction of radioactivity to levels that allow either:
 - ✓ Restricted release of property or
 - ✓ Unrestricted release of property.
 - License termination, transfer or modification

General

- Overview:
 - Amount:
 - Based on site specific cost estimates (most often)
 - Must be increased if cost estimate increases.
 - Information Provided – must be:
 - Sufficient to allow independent DRC determination of adequacy.
 - Reasonable estimates for site control, decommissioning, maintenance, etc.
 - Developed with standard professional engineering guidance and practice.

General

- Cost Estimates – must:
 - Assume decommissioning by 3rd Party contractor (not DRC or State staff).
 - Apply appropriate contingency factors.
 - › Contingency - for unexpected, unknown, or un-measurable costs.

General

- Beneficiary
 - Utah Radiation Control Board
 - Executive Secretary
 - › Must have full access to funds
 - › May demand payment

General

- **Examples of Financial Mechanisms*:**
 - Cash / Cash Equivalent Deposits (C/CED)
 - Escrow Agreement (EA)
 - Irrevocable Letter of Credit (ILOC)
 - Statement of Intent (Sol)
 - Surety Bonds (SB)

** Combinations of the above – may be approved*

General

- **Current DRC Licensees (16 total)**
 - Cash / Cash Equivalent Deposits = 1
 - Escrow Agreement = 4
 - Irrevocable Letter of Credit = 7
 - Statement of Intent = 2
 - Surety Bonds = 2

General

- **Cash / Cash Equivalent Deposit (C/CED)**
 - Cash, Certificate of Deposit, or Government Guaranteed Securities deposited by Licensee.
- **Escrow Agreement (EA)**
 - Special bank account administered by a financial institution acting as escrow agent for Licensee.
- **Irrevocable Letter of Credit (ILoC)**
 - Formalized line of credit extended by a bank on behalf of Licensee.

General

- **Statement of Intent (Sol)**
 - Written commitment by a government agency Licensee to request and obtain decommissioning funds from its funding body when necessary.
- **Surety Bond (SB)**
 - Guarantee by a private company that it will fund decommissioning if Licensee fails to do so.

General

• Rules* / Examples of Licensees:

- UAC R313-22-35 – Financial Assurance and Recordkeeping for Decommissioning
 - > Isomedix Operations, Inc
 - > University of Utah
- UAC R313-24 – Uranium Mills and Source Material Mill Tailings Disposal (10 CFR 40, Appendix A, Criterion 9)
 - > Denison Mines
- UAC R313-25-31 – Funding for LLRW Disposal Site Closure and Stabilization
 - > EnergySolutions

* Copy of DRC rules found in Attachment 1.

Radioactive Material Licenses (currently approved values)

Licensee	Instrument	Amount
Autoliv ASP, Inc	EA	\$44,603
Brigham Young University	EA	\$129,000
Cavanagh Services Group, Inc	ILoC	\$225,000
Intermountain Medical Center	SB	\$113,000
Isomedix Operations, Inc.	ILoC	\$322,570
RWM-Utah, Inc.	EA	\$205,000
Tracerco	EA	\$5,716
University of Utah	Sol	\$1,216,000
Utah State University	Sol	\$245,000
Westinghouse Electric Company	ILoC	\$25,517,000
Westinghouse Electric Company	ILoC	See above
Count = 11 Licenses	Subtotal:	\$28,022,889

Uranium Mills / EnergySolutions (currently approved values)

Licensee	Instrument	Amount
Uranium Mills		
Denison Mines (USA)	SB	\$15,017,129
Rio Algom Mining	ILoC	\$2,214,386
Uranium One Utah, Inc.	C/CED	\$7,248,816
Subtotal:		\$24,480,311
EnergySolutions <small>(date last approved)</small>		
LLRW <small>[May 12, 2008]</small>	ILoC	\$61,831,714
11e.(2) <small>[October 9, 2008]</small>	ILoC	\$8,665,066
M.W. – DSHW <small>[February 26, 2009]</small>	ILoC	\$17,584,120
Subtotal:		\$88,080,900
Grand Total:		\$140,584,100

EnergySolutions (ES) LLRW Surety- Details

- Presentation Today
 - DRC Surety Review Process / Considerations
 - ES Surety Report Organization
 - ES Surety Report Content – selected specifics
 - Factors for Conservatism
 - Available Disposal Capacity

EnergySolutions (ES) LLRW Surety- Details

- **Review Process**
 - **Annual Surety Report**
 - Due August 31 – each year
 - **Dynamic Process – constant state of change**
 - Site Changes → Surety Changes
 - Surety = living document
 - **DRC Review Staff - responsibility**
 - Primary – Utah Licensed Professional Engineer (PE)
 - Support – Health Physics / Hydrology staff

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- **Review Process - continued**
 - **Modular Inspection Program - 2009**
 - LLRW: Engineering Module 13
 - 11e.(2): Engineering Module 30
 - **Interrogatories – Requests for Information**
 - Meetings
 - Letters / email
 - **Conditional Approval - DRC:**
 - Approves \$ amount (DRC summary table).
 - Require submittal of new ILOC (30 – 45 days)
 - **Closeout Letter – after:**
 - Revised ILOC
 - Verify \$ amount

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Inflation Adjustments – 3 Possible Options
 - Consumer Price Index (CPI)
 - Annual 3rd Party Bids – potential problems
 - Low motivation for contractors – work not imminent
 - DRC – very labor intensive
 - R.S. Means Heavy Construction Index – preferred method
 - Published each year – November
 - Industry specific
 - Regional costs
 - Labor and Materials

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- How is LLRW Surety Report Organized?
 - Brief Text (~ 12 pp.)
 - Quantity Calcs / Assumptions Spreadsheet (~ 55+ pp.)
 - See examples:
 - Attachment 2 – New Rotary Dump Facility (Section 35)
 - Attachment 3 – Disposal Volumes / Liner Construction (Section 204)
 - Supporting Tables (~ 15+ pp)
 - Equipment Lists – used on site
 - Unit Cost References - **RS Means Heavy Construction Index**
 - Detailed Cost Estimation Spreadsheet (~ 75 + pp.)
 - See Attachment 4 – New Rotary Dump Facility (Section 35)

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- LLRW Surety Report – continued
 - Professional Certification – to certify Surety (1 p.):
 - > Utah Licensed PE certified
 - > Use of approved drawings / specifications
 - RS Means Comparison Table (~ 8 pp.)
 - Unit Costs – current vs. previous year comparison
 - Conceptual Closure Plan (~ 2 pp. + 4 maps)
 - > Brief Text
 - > Conceptual engineering drawings / maps

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- LLRW Surety Calculations - Spreadsheets
 - Cost Estimate = Quantity x Unit Cost**
 - Quantities – e.g. *dimensions, weight, area, volumes, etc.*
 - Unit Costs – e.g. *\$ per unit dimensions, weight, area, volumes, etc.*
 - > RS Means Heavy Construction Index
 - > Some 3rd Party Quotes (when RS Means not available)
 - ***Don't forget your units!***

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- LLRW Cost Estimate – 4 Basic Categories (1)
 - Direct Costs (Sections 1 – 211)
 - In-Direct Costs (Sections 300 – 307)
 - Post Closure Monitoring Costs (Sections 400 – 502)
 - Future Expenses - set-aside \$
 - Years 1 - 100
 - Supplement to Perpetual Care Fund (Section 504)
 - Supplement = \$13 Million – current PCF balance

(1) As approved by DRC on May 12, 2008. New sections added as needed.

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Direct Costs* (Sections 1 – 211)
 - Specific Structures / Facilities (Section 1 – 105)
 - *examples include (but not limited to):*
 - Administration Building
 - Rail Wash Facilities
 - Haul Roads
 - Shredder Facility
 - Railroad Track and Rail Bed
 - ~ 38 Others

* See Attachment 5 for summary (May 12, 2008 Approval)

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Direct Costs (Sections 1 – 211)
 - General Activities (Sections 200 – 211)
 - examples include (but are not limited to):
 - Equipment Disposal (Section 201)
 - Health Physics / Radiation Survey Equipment (Section 203)
 - Disposal Volumes / On-site Demolition (Section 204)
 - ✓ Reserved Disposal Capacity
 - Quantity Calculations - see ES summary in Attachment 3 (lines 3817 - 3711)
 - Cost Estimations – ES Cost Estimation Spreadsheet (Sections 1 – 211)

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Direct Costs (Sections 1 – 211)
 - General Activities (Sections 200 – 211) - continued
 - Temporary Cover / Settlement Monitoring (Section 205)
 - Embankment Surcharging (Section 206)
 - Cover Construction (Section 207)
 - ✓ Rock Volumes
 - Quantity Needed – see Attachment 6
 - January 13, 2004 PEPG Engineering Report
 - DRC Staff – Professional Geologist
 - Rock Unit Costs – see Attachment 7
 - BLM – November 9, 2007 letter
 - 5 Other Sections

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Direct Costs (Sections 1 – 211)
 - Currently Approved = **\$29,468,548** (May 12, 2008)
 - Factor – for Indirect Costs
 - Compounding Conservatism
- In-Direct Costs (Sections 300 – 307)
 - Set by License Condition 73.B

ES LLRW Surety - Details

In-Direct Costs (approved on May 12, 2008)			
Sec.	Description	% of Direct Costs	Current Approved \$
300	Working Conditions (escalation factor)	5.5	\$1,620,770
301	Mobilization / Demobilization	4.0	\$1,178,742
302	Contingency (unexpected, unknown costs)	11.0	\$3,241,540
303	Engineering and Re-design	2.25	\$663,042
304	Overhead and Profit	19.0	\$5,599,024
305	Management Fee and Legal Expenses	4.0	\$1,178,742
306	DEQ Oversight	4.0	\$1,178,742
307	Supplemental Mobilization (after waste surcharge and cover completion)	4.0 ⁽¹⁾	\$512,361
	Total:	49.75	\$15,172,963

Footnote:
1) 4% of Direct Cost Items 206 and 207 only.

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Post Closure Monitoring Costs (Sections 400 – 502)
 - Years 1 - 100
 - Monitoring Activities – examples:
 - › Surface and Groundwater Sampling
 - › Elevation Surveys – Settlement Stands / Cover system
 - › Air Monitoring
 - › Soil Sampling
 - › Gamma Exposure Monitoring
 - › Radon Monitoring
 - Monitoring Frequency
 - › More at first
 - › Less with time

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- Post Closure Monitoring Costs (Section 502)
 - Current value - \$ set-aside for future expenses

ES Surety – Section 502	
Category	Approved Amount \$ ⁽¹⁾
Years 1 – 50	\$4,378,069
Years 51 – 100	\$2,452,316
Total:	\$6,830,385

Footnote:

1) LLRW surety approved by DRC on May 12, 2008.

ES LLRW Surety - Details

• LLRW Cost Estimate Summary

Category	Sections	Approved Cost Estimate (1)
Direct Costs	1 - 211	\$29,468,548
In-Direct Costs	300 - 307	\$15,172,963
Post Closure Monitoring	400 - 502	\$6,830,385
Supplement to PCF	504	\$10,359,818
	Total:	\$61,831,714

Footnote:

1) LLRW surety approved by DRC on May 12, 2008.

ES LLRW Surety - Details

• Built-in Conservatism

▪ Frequent DRC Reviews

- Annual Report – due August 31
- Occasional Mid-Year – significant new construction approved only after surety adjustment
 - ✓ New Rotary Dump
 - ✓ Shredder facilities, etc.

▪ RS Means Index

- On average = conservative
- Most recent index required (License Condition 73.C)

▪ Direct Costs → Indirect Costs

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- **Built-in Conservatism**
 - **Contingency** – for costs unexpected / unknown
 - › If known / expected → add new section
 - **License Limits – Site Operations**
 - › e.g. on-site un-disposed waste volume limit
 - › Surety Estimate – quantities based on License limit
 - › DRC Inspections / Enforcement
 - **Professional License / Certification**
 - Required by License Condition 73.D
 - › ES Preparer - certifies
 - › DRC Reviewer

ES LLRW Surety - Details

- **Built-in Conservatism - continued**
 - **Philosophy – Scenario Range** (Quantities / Assumptions)
 - › **Worst Case** – DRC benefit
 - › **Middle Case** – neutral
 - › **Best Case** – Licensee benefit
 - › e.g. On-site un-disposed waste – unload @ old rollover facility vs. new rotary dump
 - **DRC Review Process** – guidance to staff
 - › ES over-estimation – let stand
 - › ES under-estimation – ask for corrections

ES Available Disposal Capacity

- Surety Report – due August 31
 - Disposal Volume Needed at Closure (V_{nc})
 - > Estimated by spreadsheet calculations
 - As-Built Report – due December 31
 - > Aerial Photography – stereo photos flown in August
 - > Topographic Maps - prepared via stereo photos
 - > 2 Surfaces – both 3 Dimensional
 - ✓ Current Waste Elevations – aerial photos
 - ✓ Approved Engineering Design – maximum waste elevations
 - > ES uses Autocad software


ES Available Disposal Capacity

Remaining Disposal Capacity (V_{rdc}) → Subtract 2 surfaces

$$V_{rdc} = V_{ad} - V_{cw}, \text{ where:}$$

V_{ad} = approved design volume

V_{cw} = current waste volume



Blue = current waste elevation / volume

Green = approved engineering design (maximum waste elevation)

ES Available Disposal Capacity

- As-Built Report – continued
 - DRC Review – evaluates:
 - > ES Reported Values
 - ✓ Current Waste Footprint Area / Elevations
 - ✓ Waste Volumes – each cell
 - ✓ Total Remaining Site Capacity – for waste disposal
 - > Compare - against approved engineering design
 - > DRC Approval Criteria:

$$\text{Is } V_{nc} < V_{rdc} ?$$

Financial Assurance

- Questions?

- IV. X-Ray Registration/Inspection (**Board Action Item**)
 - a. Approval to distribute letter: "Raising Awareness of X-Ray Exposure to Patients."



State of Utah

JON M. HUNTSMAN, JR.
Governor

GARY HERBERT
Lieutenant Governor

Department of Environmental Quality

William J. Sinclair
Executive Director

DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Dane L. Finerfrock
Director

Radiation Control Board
Peter A. Jenkins, M.S., C.H.P., *Chair*
Elizabeth Goryunova, M.S., *Vice-Chair*
Scott Bird
Patrick D. Cone
Frank D. DeRosso, M.S.P.H., C.I.H.
Christian K. Gardner
Edd Johnson
Douglas Scott Kimball, D.M.D.
Colleen S. Johnson, *Commissioner*
Joseph K. Miner, M.D., M.S.P.H.
William J. Sinclair
John W. Thomson, M.D.
David A. Tripp, Ph.D.
Dane L. Finerfrock, *Executive Secretary*

April 14, 2009

*Original
letter
w/changes*

ADDRESSEES

All Utah medical facilities with a registered computed tomography system and qualified experts.

During the past several years, the medical and medical physics communities have raised concerns about the widespread use of multi-slice computed tomography (CT) and the resulting increases in radiation exposure to patients. These concerns have most recently led to the "Image Gently Campaign: Working Together to Change Practice" sponsored by the Alliance for Radiation Safety in Pediatric Imaging (www.imagegently.org)*. While CT imaging is acknowledged as an essential tool for diagnosis, the overall radiation dose to the population, especially children, has grown dramatically with the introduction of multi-slice scanners.

The purpose of this letter is fourfold: to raise awareness of the radiation burden to patients; to encourage the use of appropriateness criteria in choosing the imaging modality to be performed; to urge conscientious quality control and the lowest radiation dose commensurate with good imaging; and, finally, to encourage facilities to seek American College of Radiology accreditation for their CT programs.

At a recent meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), one of the main topics of discussion was the use of CT. During the past two decades, medical exposures to ionizing radiation have increased in number and in dose, significantly raising the radiation burden to the population exposed. According to the NCRP, the largest increase comes from the use of CT scanning which is increasing 10-15 percent each year. There were approximately 3 million scans performed in the United States in 1980. By 2005, the annual number of scans had grown 20 fold, to 60 million. This type of growth has both potential benefits and risks. Specifically, the potential for making a diagnosis must be weighed carefully against the risk of carcinogenesis in the future.

When CT was first introduced, the examination was almost always requested in the form of a consultation with the radiologist. Today, the ordering practitioner has carte blanche access to all types of medical imaging procedures. This lack of a consultation eliminated the step whereby the radiologist acted as gatekeeper, thus preventing an honest discussion of the benefits versus the risks that are imposed by a specific imaging procedure or the availability of alternative imaging options. To provide guidance in ordering studies, the American College of Radiology (ACR)

established appropriateness criteria describing when a specific type of imaging procedure should be performed. We encourage each and every physician to review the ACR Appropriateness Criteria[®] and whenever possible, to hold a consultation with the radiologist and discuss alternative imaging procedures.

Facilities have a number of options available when choosing and setting up their CT equipment that impact the dose given to the patient. In January of this year, the American Association of Physicists in Medicine (www.aapm.org) published Report No. 96, "The Measurement, Reporting and Management of Radiation Dose in CT." In addition to an overview of the technology and dose determination, this report provides methods for dose reduction. Of special interest are the technique charts based on age or size of the patient and a review of automatic exposure control systems. Facilities should use this document, along with other reports, such as ImageGently's "Pediatric CT Guidance and Worksheet on How to Develop CT Protocols for Children," to maximize image quality using the lowest feasible doses.

We also encourage all facilities to become accredited under the ACR Computed Tomography accreditation program. Information concerning the ACR Appropriateness Criteria as well as the accreditation program can be found at www.acr.org. The accreditation process assures that facilities periodically focus on the specific technology and "keep up" with the community standard.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation and attention to this important public health concern. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact the Division of Radiation Control at 801-536-4250.

Sincerely,

Peter A Jenkins, Chair
Radiation Control Board


* The founding organizations of the Alliance for Radiation Safety in Pediatric Imaging include the Society for Pediatric Radiology, the American College of Radiology, the American Society of Radiologic Technologists and the American Association of Physicists in Medicine. For a complete list of affiliated organizations and more information on the initiative, please go to www.imagegently.org.

Change
Requested
By Joseph
K. Miller

- V. Radioactive Waste (**Board Information Item**)
 - a. Nuclear Regulatory Commission plan for rulemaking for disposal of Depleted Uranium

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20555



INTERNET: OPAGNRC.GOV

301-415-8200

Vol. 29; No. 12

Week Ending March 20, 2009

NEWS RELEASES

No. 09-052

March 18, 2009

NRC DIRECTS STAFF TO INITIATE RULEMAKING ON DEPLETED URANIUM DISPOSAL

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has directed the agency staff to draft amendments to regulations regarding low-level radioactive waste to accommodate disposal of large amounts of depleted uranium.

In a Staff Requirements Memorandum issued March 18, the Commission accepted the staff's recommendation that the agency continue to consider depleted uranium as Class A low-level waste, but amend regulations in 10 CFR Part 61 to require a site-specific analysis for the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium and the technical requirements for such an analysis. The Commission also directed the staff to develop a guidance document for public comment that outlines the parameters and assumptions to be used in conducting the site-specific analyses.

The Commission stressed that the rulemaking was not intended to change the current classification of depleted uranium as Class A waste. "Eventual changes to waste classification designations in the regulations must be analyzed in light of the total amount of depleted uranium being disposed of at any given site," the Commission said in its memorandum.

The Commission noted, however, that for "significant amounts of depleted uranium, there may be a need to place additional restrictions on the disposal of the depleted uranium at a specific site or deny such disposal based on unique site characteristics." Those restrictions would be identified through the site-specific analysis, it said.

The Commission also directed the staff to conduct a public workshop with "all potentially affected stakeholders" to discuss issues associated with the disposal of depleted uranium, the potential issues to be considered in rulemaking, and technical parameters of concern in the analysis so that informed decisions can be made in the interim period until the regulatory changes are final.

Depleted uranium is the byproduct, or tails, of the uranium enrichment process, a key point in the production of fuel for nuclear power reactors. The staff proposal (SECY-08-147) fulfilled an earlier Commission directive in the adjudicatory proceeding regarding Louisiana Energy Services' application for a license to construct and operate a gas centrifuge enrichment plant in New Mexico. That license was granted in June 2006, and the plant is now under construction.

**RULEMAKING ISSUE
(NOTATION VOTE)**

October 7, 2008

SECY-08-0147

FOR: The Commissioners

FROM: R. W. Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO COMMISSION ORDER CLI-05-20 REGARDING
DEPLETED URANIUM

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this paper is to respond to the Commission direction provided in Order CLI-05-20 (In the Matter of Louisiana Energy Services [LES], October 19, 2005). In this Order, the Commission directed staff, "outside of the LES adjudication, to consider whether the quantities of depleted uranium (DU) at issue in the waste stream from uranium enrichment facilities warrant amending section 61.55(a)(6) or the section 61.55(a) waste classification tables." This paper presents four possible regulatory approaches in response to this direction and requests approval of the recommended approach selected in this paper. This paper does not address any new commitments.

SUMMARY:

Staff completed a technical analysis (see Enclosure 1) to understand the impacts of near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU, such as those expected to be generated at uranium enrichment facilities. The technical analysis addressed whether amendments to § 61.55(a) are necessary to assure large quantities of DU are disposed of in a manner that meets the performance objectives in Subpart C of 10 CFR Part 61. The analysis concluded that

CONTACT: Priya Yadav, FSME/DWMEP
(301) 415-6667

near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU may be appropriate, but not under all site conditions. Shallow disposal of large quantities of DU or disposal at humid sites with a potable groundwater pathway would likely result in the performance objectives not being met. Because of the unique characteristics of the waste and the additional considerations required for its disposal, staff concluded that existing regulations need to be amended to ensure that large quantities of DU are disposed of safely.

Staff recommends conducting a limited rulemaking to revise Part 61 to specify the need for a disposal facility licensee or applicant to conduct a site-specific analysis that addresses the unique characteristics of the waste and the additional considerations required for its disposal prior to disposal of large quantities of DU and other unique waste streams such as reprocessing waste. The technical requirements associated with disposal of large quantities of DU would be developed through the rulemaking process. Specific parameters and assumptions staff recommends for conducting the site-specific analysis would be incorporated into a guidance document that would be issued for public comment prior to being finalized.

BACKGROUND:

The licensing of new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States has brought DU to the forefront of low-level waste (LLW) disposal issues. The DU waste stream is unique; the relatively high concentrations and large quantities of DU that are generated by enrichment facilities were not considered in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) supporting the development of 10 CFR Part 61.¹ When the FEIS was issued in 1982, there were no commercial facilities generating large amounts of DU waste, therefore, the FEIS considered only the types of uranium-bearing waste streams being typically disposed of by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees at the time.² The NRC concluded that those waste streams posed an insufficient hazard to warrant establishing a concentration limit for uranium in the waste classification tables in 10 CFR 61.

With the existing U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) stockpile of DU at the Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants, and the recent licensing of LES National Enrichment Facility (NEF) and the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) American Centrifuge Plant, more than 1 million metric tons of depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF₆) will need a disposition path.³ Existing disposal facilities such as the EnergySolutions facility in Clive, Utah and the proposed Waste Control Specialists (WCS) LLW facility in Andrews County, Texas have expressed interest to their Agreement State regulators in disposal of large quantities of DU at their sites.

¹ Part 61 FEIS, NUREG-0945, Vol. 1, (November 1982) at 5-38. The FEIS relies on extensive analysis and calculations found in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) that are incorporated by reference. The references in this paper to the FEIS include the supporting information found in the DEIS.

² The Part 61 FEIS (NUREG-0945, November 1982) considered 17 Curies of U²³⁸ compared to approximately 100,000 - 200,000 Curies of U²³⁸ that will be generated from LES during its 25-year lifespan (FEIS for the Proposed National Enrichment Facility in Lea County, New Mexico, NUREG-1790, June 2005).

³ Draft Supplement Analysis for Locations to Dispose of DU Conversion Product Generated from DOE's Inventory of DUF₆, (DOE/EIS-0359-SA1 and DOE/EIS-0360-SA1), March 2007 at p. 43; FEIS for the Proposed National Enrichment Facility in Lea County, New Mexico, NUREG-1790, June 2005 at p. 2-27; FEIS for the Proposed American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, NUREG-1834, April 2006) at p. 4-51.

As the Commission indicated in Order CLI-05-20, the current waste classification for DU is "based upon § 61.55(a)(6), which specifies that if radioactive waste does not contain any of the radionuclides listed in either of two listed waste classification tables, it is Class A waste. Depleted uranium does not contain the radionuclides listed in the specified tables, and therefore under a plain reading of the regulation, depleted uranium is a Class A waste." As such, any existing disposal facility currently licensed to accept Class A waste represents a potential disposal path for the DU waste stream.

To fully understand how DU is currently being disposed of, staff communicated with Agreement State regulators that oversee existing or proposed LLW disposal facilities in their States (i.e., South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington). Most of these disposal facilities have accepted small quantities of DU in the past. In general, these State regulators agreed with the need to handle large quantities of DU as a unique waste stream, regardless of its current waste classification, and agreed that additional analysis should be conducted prior to its disposal. The Utah Division of Radiation Control indicated that EnergySolutions has completed site-specific performance modeling for disposal of natural uranium at their Clive, Utah site, and EnergySolutions concluded that even when the disposal cells were assumed to contain 100 percent natural uranium, risks were found to be within Utah Administrative Code regulatory limits, which are comparable to those in Part 61. EnergySolutions compared the risk from natural uranium to the risk associated with DU and found that DU can be safely placed in their facility.⁴ This conclusion is based on numerous assumptions that can be found in EnergySolutions' performance assessment.

Similarly, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) requires its licensees and applicants to perform additional analysis prior to disposal of large quantities of DU. For example, the draft license for WCS' LLW disposal facility issued August 12, 2008, states that in order to dispose of DU, "information on complete waste profiles, radionuclide information, total radioactivity, radionuclide concentrations, chemical constituents, and analysis of any impacts to members of the public and the environment must be submitted as an application for amendment to this license." Currently, the TCEQ has not received information from WCS to satisfy this requirement. Finally, the Washington Department of Health has completed a performance assessment for the U.S. Ecology LLW disposal facility related to site closure that does not currently include large quantities of DU; however, the analysis could be modified to include the impacts from DU disposal. Staff did not contact enrichment facility licensees or other potential licensees when conducting its analysis.

In order to develop an informed response to the Commission direction, the staff performed a technical analysis to evaluate the impacts of near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU and to determine if amendments to § 61.55(a) are necessary to assure that large quantities of DU are disposed of in a manner that meets the performance objectives of Part 61.⁵ The results of

⁴ "Review of the Institute of Energy and Environmental Research Report Related to Shallow Land Disposal of Depleted Uranium," Enchemica, LLC, (November 21, 2007).

⁵ The staff also considered whether requirements for uranium mill tailings impoundments in 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A, could be applied to disposal of large quantities of DU in a Part 61 LLW disposal facility. For example, Part 40 requires that the disposal design control radiological hazard from radon for 1,000 years. However, uranium mill tailings are a significantly different source term than the large quantities of DU from enrichment facilities, because the concentration of radium and radon in mill tailings is generally at its maximum concentration when disposed of and slowly decreases over time, in comparison to DU, where these daughter products increase over time and exceed the

this technical analysis are summarized in the discussion below; Enclosure 1 provides additional detail. Following the summary of the technical analysis, this paper presents four possible regulatory approaches to respond to the Commission direction.

In addition to these four approaches, the staff also evaluated the use of § 61.58 during development of this paper. This section of Part 61 may have been designed to allow licensees to perform and submit evaluations to address the performance requirements in Subpart C to Part 61 without a rule change. But the use of an exception provision like § 61.58 to *require* an additional site-specific study on certain Class A waste streams, without any associated rule change, is inconsistent with the basic premise of an exception. Specifically, the purpose of building an exception into a generally applicable rule is to allow an activity that would not otherwise be permitted, rather than to impose an additional requirement (e.g., performance of a site-specific study) on an activity that is already permitted (e.g., near-surface disposal of Class A waste). Thus, if § 61.58 were utilized to approve an alternate classification or characteristic, such action would provide additional options for a licensee, but would not require use of a particular option. Compliance with the approved alternative would not be the *only* method of compliance. Therefore, if the staff intended to use § 61.58 in order to develop an alternate waste classification or alternate characteristics for a Class A waste stream such as DU, *and to require licensees to conform to the alternate classification or characteristics as the sole method of compliance in place of (as opposed to as an alternative to) the existing regulations*, a rule change would be necessary.⁶

DISCUSSION:

Summary of Results of Technical Analysis

Staff developed a screening model to evaluate the radiological risk and uncertainties associated with near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU at a generic LLW disposal site. The generic disposal site had a broad range of climatic (e.g., humid or arid), hydrological, and geochemical conditions. The model was used to understand the impacts of key variables such as: disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, waste forms, site conditions, exposure pathways, and receptor scenarios. Calculations were performed probabilistically to

mill tailings concentration about the 1,000 year time frame. For similar disposal conditions, the peak risk (at 2 million years) from radon from DU is orders of magnitude larger than from uranium mill tailings. However, even after 1,000 years, if the radon barrier is lost (meaning that the institutional controls had failed), radon hazards at uranium mill tailings impoundments would likely produce doses to intruders that exceed 500 millirem/yr, the intruder dose objective used in the development of the Part 61 waste classification system (NUREG-0706, Final Generic EIS on Uranium Milling, September 1980). Therefore, the staff concluded that specific and unique guidance was needed for disposal of large quantities of DU in LLW facilities to mitigate the potential impacts to the intruder.

⁶ This is consistent with the discussion of § 61.58 in NUREG-1854, "NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. Department of Energy Waste Determinations: Draft Final Report for Interim Use." Specifically, NUREG-1854 states:

10 CFR 61.58 was intended to allow the NRC the flexibility of establishing alternate waste classification schemes when justified by site-specific conditions *and does not affect the generic waste classifications established in 10 CFR 61.55*. Thus, if the results of concentration calculations performed in a manner consistent with the principles and examples described previously in this document indicate that radionuclide concentrations in the waste exceed Class C limits, then the waste is greater than Class C waste for waste classification purposes. If it can be demonstrated that the performance objectives of 10 CFR Part 61 can be satisfied, then the waste would be suitable for near-surface disposal. " *Id.* at 3-36 (emphasis added).

represent the impact of variability and uncertainty on the results. The analysis methodology used in the model is consistent with the technical analysis methodology found in the FEIS supporting Part 61. The model framework is based on several key assumptions, which are detailed in Enclosure 1.

The technical analysis concluded that near-surface disposal (i.e., at a depth of less than 30 meters [m], as defined in Part 61) may be appropriate for large quantities of DU under certain conditions. However, unfavorable site conditions, such as shallow disposal (i.e., at a depth of less than 3 m) or disposal at humid sites with a potable groundwater pathway, could exceed the performance objectives of Part 61, Subpart C. Although shallow disposal for large quantities of DU is not likely to be appropriate regardless of site conditions, small quantities (approximately 1 – 10 metric tons) of DU could be disposed of at shallow depths.

Regulatory Options for Waste Classification

Based on the results of the technical analysis, staff believes that a change to existing regulations or a generic communication is necessary to ensure large quantities of DU are disposed of safely. Staff identified four options that it believes would facilitate safe disposal. Each option would likely draw significant stakeholder input from LLW disposal facilities interested in disposing of DU; commercial enrichment facilities generating DU; as well as DOE, who has responsibility for disposal of DU from NRC licensed enrichment facilities, if requested,⁷ and responsibility for disposal of Greater than Class C (GTCC) waste.

The options and a summary of the pros and cons for each option are discussed below. The resources required for each option are presented in Enclosure 2. A complete discussion of the staff's evaluation of the use of § 61.58 is presented in Enclosure 3.

Option 1 – Generic Communication to Clarify Need to Demonstrate Compliance with Performance Objectives

In Order CLI-05-05 (In the Matter of LES, January 18, 2005), the Commission stated "In the end, the 'bottom line for disposal' of low-level radioactive wastes are the performance objectives of 10 C.F.R. Subpart C, which set forth the ultimate standards and radiation limits for (1) protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity; (2) protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion; (3) protection of individuals during operations; (4) and stability of the disposal site after closure." Under Option 1, staff would issue a generic communication (e.g., a regulatory issue summary) that would reiterate the Commission's statement expressed in Order CLI-05-05 and would clarify acceptable methods for dealing with unique waste streams like large quantities of DU. The generic communication would emphasize that compliance with the existing performance objectives needs to be demonstrated through analysis and that classification under § 61.55(a)(6) should not be relied upon for this purpose. After developing the generic communication, staff would revise the associated guidance documents to describe an acceptable method for conducting a site-specific analysis for nuclides or concentrations not specifically covered in the waste classification tables. The specific parameters and assumptions

⁷ Section 3113 of 1996 USEC Privatization Act.

staff recommends for conducting the site-specific analysis would be included in the guidance documents, which would undergo public comment and stakeholder input prior to being finalized.

This option relies upon the fact that one of the principal objectives in the development of Part 61 was to prepare a performance-based rulemaking that could accommodate a wide range of disposal sites and waste streams. The performance objectives for protection of the general population and for intruders in § 61.42 are general, providing a framework for considering site-specific waste stream characteristics, site geotechnical conditions, site operations, and site design. In addition, applicants for low-level disposal site licenses must provide, under § 61.13, technical analyses needed to demonstrate that the performance objectives of Part 61 are met. Specific information needed for the application is described in § 61.12 and includes a description of the kind, amount, classification, and specification of the radioactive material proposed to be received, possessed, and disposed of at the disposal facility. Therefore, any unique waste streams would need to be considered in the technical analyses required under § 61.13. In addition, under § 61.25, once a license is granted, the licensee cannot make changes to the disposal facility or procedures described in the license application unless the changes are in accordance with specific license conditions. These license conditions restrict changes that are important to public health and safety and would consider whether or not prior Commission or Agreement State approval is required. Furthermore, if a licensee requests an amendment to their license concerning waste disposal, the same criteria (§ 61.23) must be met as for the initial issuance of the license.

A generic communication could provide clarification concerning the need for site-specific evaluations, since the requirement to conduct an inadvertent intruder analysis similar to that conducted to develop the § 61.55 waste classification tables is not specifically identified in Part 61 and may not be well understood. As a result, applicants or licensees could misinterpret the regulations to only require compliance with the concentration limits in the waste classification tables for ensuring protection of the intruder, as required by § 61.42. As such, there remains concern that waste types not previously examined in the Part 61 FEIS and not specifically and explicitly addressed in the provisions of Part 61 being disposed of without adequate site-specific analysis.

Through communication with the Agreement State regulators, the NRC staff has learned that DU is already being given special consideration as a unique waste stream. For the commercial LLW disposal facilities where large quantities of DU are most likely to be disposed, some site-specific evaluation has already been performed by the licensee or the Agreement State regulatory authority, or the regulatory authority plans to require the licensee to perform a site-specific evaluation prior to disposal of large quantities of DU. As such, Option 1 allows Agreement State regulators to continue with their current policies under the existing regulations, without conducting a rulemaking to revise NRC regulations.

The primary advantages of Option 1 are that it would not require rulemaking and would require fewer resources than the other options. In addition, it is staff's understanding that Agreement State regulators believe a site-specific analysis is needed for large quantities of DU, and indicated that they intend to rely heavily upon NRC staff's guidance for conducting these analyses at the facilities they regulate. A generic communication would clarify the need to demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives and the Agreement States could request that their licensees and applicants perform site-specific analyses prior to disposal of

large quantities of DU or other unique waste streams. The primary disadvantage of Option 1 is that the Agreement State regulators would not be able to require licensees and applicants to perform a site-specific analysis. Licensees and applicants would be free to propose alternative methods of complying with the regulations, which the regulators would then have to evaluate to determine whether the methods proposed by the licensee or applicant comply with the performance objectives of Part 61.

Option 2 – Rulemaking to specify requirement for site-specific analysis in § 61.55(a)(6)

In discussion with Agreement State regulators, one stakeholder commented that a revision to NRC's regulations may make it easier to request a site-specific analysis from the licensee. Therefore, Option 2 is a limited rulemaking to revise Part 61 to reflect a requirement to perform a site-specific analysis prior to disposal of large quantities of DU. This change would be assigned a compatibility category that would require Agreement States to adopt and make conforming changes to their regulations (e.g., compatibility category B).

As discussed above, the results of the technical analysis confirm that small quantities of DU (approximately 1 – 10 metric tons) may be disposed of at shallow depths and meet the performance objectives of Part 61. This result is consistent with the Part 61 FEIS conclusion that "the types of uranium-bearing wastes being typically disposed of by NRC licensees do not present a sufficient hazard to warrant limitation on the concentration of this naturally occurring material. Both depleted and enriched uranium typically do not contain daughter products in any quantity because of the relatively short time since uranium was refined from the ore, compared to the half-lives of the uranium isotopes. The daughter products [of natural uranium ore] are disposed of primarily as uranium mill tailings."⁸ The Statement of Considerations for Part 61 adds that for these reasons, "uranium has been removed as a radionuclide that must be considered for waste classification."⁹

Because small quantities and lower concentrations of uranium were considered in the FEIS, staff believes there is no benefit to changing the existing classification for small quantities of DU in § 61.55(a)(6). It is the large quantities and higher concentration of DU that create a potential health and safety concern, and staff believes that the goal of any changes to Part 61 should be to provide a means to ensure additional disposal considerations are taken for DU, based on the quantity of material at issue. A site-specific analysis is a risk-informed mechanism to understand potential impacts from the type and quantity of material being disposed, accounting for the unique site characteristics present at the receiving disposal facility. Specific technical requirements for how to perform this site-specific analysis would ensure it is consistent with the analysis performed to develop the waste classification tables in § 61.55, which would result in a standard that is as protective of health and safety as a generic waste classification for DU.

As such, Option 2 includes modifying Part 61 as follows:

§ 61.55(a)(6) currently reads:

⁸ Part 61 FEIS, NUREG-0945, Vol. 1, (November 1982) at 5-38.

⁹ Federal Register, December 27, 1982, Vol. 47, No 248, page 57456.

If the radioactive waste does not contain any nuclides listed in either Table 1 or 2, it is Class A.

Proposed Change: Modify paragraph 61.55(a)(6) to include a statement that, for unique waste streams including, but not limited to, large quantities of depleted uranium, the requirements of § 61.55(a)(9) of this part must be met. Section 61.55(a) would then be modified to include a paragraph (a)(9), which would include a requirement that *the disposal facility licensee must perform, and the Commission must approve, a site-specific analysis demonstrating that the unique waste stream, including large quantities of depleted uranium, can be disposed of at the site in conformance with the performance objectives in subpart C to Part 61.*

Staff proposes that the rule language be broad enough to include other unique waste streams that may arise in the future, so that additional rulemakings may not be necessary. The term "unique waste streams" would be defined in the rule language. As currently envisioned, unique waste streams could include those that may result from spent fuel reprocessing, or other types of waste streams that could emerge in the future from new kinds of facilities that generate significantly different concentrations and quantities of waste not previously considered in the Part 61 FEIS. Similarly, staff intends to define "large quantities" of DU in the rule language as quantities similar to those being generated at uranium enrichment facilities. Staff does not intend to submit a rulemaking plan to the Commission for the rulemaking under this option.

In order to ensure that the site-specific analyses that would be conducted by licensees and applicants are consistent with the analysis performed in the Part 61 FEIS, and to be protective of public health and safety, staff believes certain technical requirements will also need to be specified in the rule language in paragraph (a)(9). For example, the type of receptors used to assess protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity, the exposure scenarios evaluated to protect individuals from inadvertent intrusion, and the period of performance evaluated are key parameters that affect the determination of suitability of disposal of large quantities of DU. Therefore, under Option 2, the specific technical requirements associated with disposal of large quantities of DU (as well as other unique waste streams) would be developed in the notice and comment rulemaking process. Option 2 also involves developing and issuing a guidance document that would provide the Agreement State regulators, and their licensees and applicants, technical guidance to conduct these site-specific analyses.

The primary advantage of Option 2 is that it creates a legally binding requirement, which ensures a site-specific analysis is performed by licensees and applicants and reviewed and approved by the Commission or Agreement State regulators. The staff believes that this outcome is consistent with the Commission's expectations set forth in its June 2, 2006, Order CLI-06-15 (In the Matter of LES). Specifically, the Commission stated "*We would expect the appropriate regulatory authority to conduct any site-specific evaluations necessary to confirm that radiological dose limits and standards can be met at the disposal facility, in light of the quantities of depleted uranium envisioned.*" (emphasis added). Because the Commission expects such an analysis to be conducted, staff believes it is appropriate to codify this expectation in the rulemaking under this option. Furthermore, several Agreement State regulators indicated that they preferred this option because it could be easily enforced. In addition, this option ensures the protection of health and safety by imposing an additional

requirement for large quantities of DU in a risk-informed manner that will be consistent with the analysis performed to develop the waste classification tables in § 61.55. The primary disadvantage of Option 2 is that, unlike other radionuclides in the waste classification tables, large quantities of DU would require a site-specific analysis instead of the use of a convenient table with a specific concentration limit. This option would also be more resource intensive than Option 1.

Option 3 – Determine classification for DU within existing classification framework

Staff believes some stakeholders may be interested in a specific waste classification for DU, within the existing Part 61 waste classification framework. Therefore, Option 3 involves developing a generic waste classification (e.g., A, B, C, or GTCC) for DU and an associated concentration limit to be added to the waste classification tables. Staff would begin with the technical analysis described in Enclosure 1, which was consistent with the Part 61 methodology but updated to include recent advances in modeling and performance assessment techniques. The result of staff's additional analysis would be a concentration limit for a generic LLW site in the United States. Consistent with the assumptions in the original Part 61 analysis, this concentration limit would likely be based conservatively on potential disposal at a "reference" humid, eastern LLW disposal site.¹⁰ Subsequent to completion of this analysis, staff would initiate a rulemaking to revise the waste classification tables to explicitly include DU.

The primary advantage of Option 3 is that DU would be given a specific concentration limit, similar to the other radionuclides currently listed in § 61.55, and a specific waste classification that would apply to any LLW disposal site in the United States. The development of such a generic classification could prove useful if the current LLW environment were to change drastically in the future (e.g., if several new LLW disposal facilities are proposed) because it would eliminate the need for a site-specific analysis for large quantities of DU. The primary disadvantage of Option 3 is that the concentration limit developed could be so low for a reference site that it would unnecessarily constrain disposal options at sites with significantly different characteristics (e.g., humid vs. arid). As such, this approach would be prescriptive rather than a risk-informed approach, which would take into account the performance of the waste in a specific disposal environment. Another drawback to Option 3 is that it propagates the existing waste classification system, which was developed using often conservative assumptions based on the environment for LLW at the time the Part 61 FEIS was developed; some of these assumptions are not necessarily applicable in today's environment of limited disposal options and improved performance assessment capabilities.

Option 4 – Re-examine the existing waste classification framework

A final option staff considered is to risk-inform the entire waste classification framework by using updated modeling and performance assessment techniques to evaluate and revise the existing waste classification tables for all radionuclides, if necessary, not just for DU. This revision would likely involve different methodologies and assumptions than the original Part 61 methodology for key variables, such as: disposal configurations, performance periods,

¹⁰ "To help provide conservative bounds to potential costs and impacts of waste disposal, the reference LLW disposal facility is assumed to be sited in a humid eastern environment." Part 61 FEIS, NUREG-0945, Vol. 1, (November 1982) at 4-10.

institutional control periods, waste forms, site conditions, exposure pathways, and receptor scenarios. The existing Part 61 waste classification framework is well accepted by the LLW disposal industry, and has been used successfully for more than two decades. However, as mentioned above, some of the assumptions built into the framework could be considered conservative and inconsistent with today's movement towards risk-informed regulation. In addition, the approaches to incorporate and evaluate the impacts of uncertainty and variability were more limited than those used currently.

Staff could also consider, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency's waste classification system to determine if it would be appropriate for use in the United States.¹¹ Subsequent to completion of this analysis, staff would initiate a rulemaking to revise the waste classification tables. This rulemaking would likely draw the most stakeholder input of all the options presented in this paper, as it could potentially make significant changes to the entire existing waste classification environment.

The primary advantage of Option 4 is that the waste classification framework would reflect current knowledge of the performance of LLW disposal facilities and would present risk-informed concentration limits for all radionuclides, not selectively for DU. An update of the methodology used to develop the concentration limits could result in higher or lower concentration limits than currently used, which could actually increase or decrease disposal options for some types of wastes (e.g., current Class B/C waste could become Class A waste). However, some stakeholders may view this to be "deregulation" of LLW. A disadvantage of Option 4 is that the efficiency that could be gained from updating the existing waste classification framework may not be the most effective use of agency resources, given the relatively low increase in health and safety achieved and the small number of currently operating LLW disposal facilities. Option 4 is well beyond the scope of what the Commission directed the staff to consider in Order CLI-05-20, and would require a large amount of time and resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Staff concluded that large quantities of DU can be disposed of in a near-surface disposal facility under certain conditions and meet the performance objectives of Part 61. However, staff believes a change to existing regulations is necessary to ensure large quantities of DU are disposed of safely due to the unique characteristics of the waste and additional considerations required for its disposal.

The staff recommends the Commission approve:

1. Option 2 — Rulemaking to specify a requirement for a site-specific analysis for large quantities of DU in § 61.55(a)(6) and technical requirements for such an analysis. This option provides a risk-informed approach to protecting public health and safety while causing minimal disruption to the existing waste classification system, yet codifying the requirement for a site-specific analysis in Part 61 for use by NRC, Agreement States, licensees, and future license applicants.

¹¹ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Classification of Radioactive Waste--A Safety Guide," Safety Series No.111-G-1.1. Currently being revised. See Draft Safety Guide No. DS 390, "Classification of Radioactive Waste."

2. That staff develop a guidance document for public comment that will outline the appropriate parameters and assumptions to use in conducting a site-specific analysis for disposal of large quantities of DU.

RESOURCES:

Staff's recommended option will require 2.0 full time equivalents (FTE) in FY10 to complete the documentation of the staff's technical analysis and to finish a draft of the guidance document. An additional 0.5 FTE is required to complete the technical basis for the rulemaking and to obtain stakeholder input on the guidance document. This 2.5 FTE will be obtained through a re-allocation of the common prioritization process for FY10 rulemakings. The remaining resources are needed in FY11 and FY12, and they will be requested through the budget process and the common prioritization process for upcoming rulemakings.

Enclosure 2 presents a detailed table of the resources required for each option presented in this paper.

COORDINATION

The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection concerning this paper. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this paper for resource implications and has no objections. Staff coordinated with Agreement States (Washington, Utah, South Carolina, and Texas) and DOE during the development of options for this paper.

/RA/

R. W. Borchardt
Executive Director
for Operations

Enclosure:

1. Analysis of Depleted Uranium Disposal
2. Resources
3. Depleted Uranium - Additional Options
 Evaluated

ANALYSIS OF DEPLETED URANIUM DISPOSAL

OVERVIEW:

A screening model has been developed by staff of the performance assessment branch in the Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection to evaluate the risk and uncertainties of depleted uranium (DU) disposal as low-level waste (LLW) with near-surface disposal at a generic site. The model was developed to understand the impacts of key variables on the risks from disposing of DU in near-surface disposal, such that staff could respond to Commission direction to consider whether the quantities of DU in the waste stream from uranium enrichment facilities warrant amending the waste classification tables in 10 CFR Part 61 (Part 61). The model was developed to evaluate the radiological risk to potential future residents and intruders (acute or chronic exposures) near or on the land overlying a hypothetical disposal facility for the large quantities of DU anticipated to be disposed of as a result of fuel enrichment facility operations. The model was designed to provide the user flexibility in evaluating different waste types and forms, disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, pathways, and scenarios.

The model was constructed with the dynamic simulation software package GoldSim®, developed by GoldSim Technology Group of Issaquah, WA. Goldsim is a Monte Carlo simulation software solution for dynamically modeling complex systems in business, engineering and science. GoldSim is used for decision and risk analysis by simulating future performance while quantitatively representing the uncertainty and risks inherent in all complex systems. GoldSim has been used by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to risk-inform reviews of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) performance assessments (Esh, 2002; Esh, 2006). GoldSim is used by over 30 organizations in the field of radioactive waste management. A component or modular approach can be used in GoldSim to build a performance assessment model, which is the approach used in this analysis. Main submodels include inventory, source term, infiltration, radon, groundwater transport, and biosphere. Submodels use deterministic and probabilistic input values or distributions.

The model was used to understand the impacts of key variables on the risks from disposing of DU in near-surface disposal. Key variables evaluated were: disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, waste forms, site conditions, pathways, and scenarios. Calculations were performed probabilistically to represent the impact of variability and uncertainty on the results. The analysis methodology in the current assessment was consistent with the technical analysis methodology used for the development of the environmental impact statements supporting Part 61. This approach allowed constraints to be identified for the safe disposal of large quantities of DU in near-surface disposal. Because there were a wide range of variables considered, summary conclusions are not absolute; *a site-specific analysis may demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives when the summary conclusions found below indicate otherwise*. However, the properties and characteristics of DU present constraints on approaches for disposal. The summary conclusions provide the technical framework for policy decisions. The main technical observations are:

- Depleted uranium has some characteristics that are dissimilar from commercial LLW.
 - A large percentage of the activity is associated with very long-lived radionuclides.

- Radioactive decay results in increasing hazard with time until after 1 million years, as a result of increasing concentrations (and higher mobility) of decay products.
- In-growth of significant quantities of a daughter in gaseous form (^{222}Rn)
- Estimated risks are sensitive to the performance period.
- Estimated risk from radon is sensitive to the disposal depth.
- Radon fluxes to the environment are very sensitive to the long-term moisture state of the system.
- Large uncertainties (and little available data) associated with some transfer factors for uranium daughter products.
- Estimated disposal facility performance is strongly dependent on site-specific hydrologic and geochemical conditions.
- Radon is limiting at arid sites and for shallow disposal.
- The groundwater pathway is limiting at humid sites.
- Grouting of the waste may improve the likelihood of an arid site meeting the performance objectives with respect to radon; however, grout may enhance the mobility of uranium in the groundwater pathway after the grout degrades.

The summary conclusions from the technical analysis are:

- Near-surface disposal (i.e., less than 30 meters [m], as defined in Part 61) may be appropriate for large quantities of DU under certain conditions. However, unfavorable site conditions can result in the performance objectives not being met. Examples of unfavorable conditions include shallow disposal (< 3 m depth) and humid sites with a potable groundwater pathway.
- Because of the in-growth of radon and other daughter products, periods of performance of 1,000 years or less result in a significant truncation of estimated risk.
- Shallow disposal (< 3m deep) is likely to not be appropriate for large quantities of DU, regardless of site conditions. Shallow disposal may be possible if robust intruder barriers, excluding the possible excavation of DU, and a robust radon barrier that can effectively limit radon fluxes over the period of performance are installed, and their performance is justified. Small quantities (1 – 10 metric tons) could be disposed of at shallow depths.
- Depleted uranium can be disposed of under arid conditions and meet the Part 61 performance objectives for 1,000 to 1 million year performance periods, if the waste disposal depth is large, or robust barriers are in place to mitigate radon.
- Disposal under humid conditions with viable water pathways is probably not appropriate for large quantities of DU.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW.....	i
List of Figures	iv
List of Tables	iv
Acronyms	v
INTRODUCTION	1
PROBLEM CONTEXT	1
Characteristics of DU	2
Past Regulatory Approaches to LLW Analysis	3
Period of Performance	6
ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK	8
MODEL DESCRIPTION	10
KEY RESULTS AND UNCERTAINTIES	15
Summary Results	15
Detailed Results	16
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	21
REFERENCES	23

List of Figures

Figure 1	Activity Ratios of DU and a Commercial LLW Facility	3
Figure 2	Geometric Relationship of the Disposal Units, Disposal Area, and Buffer Zone of a Disposal Site	5
Figure 3	Top-level Containment of the DU Analysis Model	11
Figure 4	Model Structure within the Main Model Container	12
Figure 5	Conceptual Model Showing the Primary Scenarios	15
Figure 6	Main Transport Pathways Implemented in the GoldSim Model	17
Figure 7	(a) Example of Dose Histories Generated for a Probabilistic Simulation (b) Dose Histories for a Resident Calculation by Exposure Pathway	20

List of Tables

Table I	Percent of Probabilistic Realizations that Meet the Performance Objectives	18
---------	--	----

Acronyms

ACNW	Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste
AEA	Atomic Energy Act
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DEIS	Draft Environmental Impact Statement
DOE	Department of Energy
DU	Depleted uranium
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FEIS	Final Environmental Impact Statement
HLW	High-Level Waste
ICRP	International Committee on Radiation Protection
LLW	Low-Level Waste
LLRW	Low-Level Radioactive Waste
LLRWPA	Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent

INTRODUCTION

The NRC staff is conducting a technical analysis to assess the potential impacts of disposal of large quantities of DU in a generic near-surface disposal facility and to determine if current low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) classification criteria warrant modification for large quantities of DU. Staff of the performance assessment branch in the Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection developed a screening model to evaluate the risk and uncertainties associated with the disposal of DU in near-surface disposal. The model was developed to understand the impacts of key variables on the risks from disposing of DU as LLW, such that the staff could respond to Commission direction to consider whether the quantities of DU in the waste stream from uranium enrichment facilities warrant amending the waste classification tables in Part 61.

The model was developed to evaluate the radiological risk to potential future residents and intruders (acute or chronic exposures) near or on the land overlying a hypothetical disposal facility for DU. The model was designed to provide the user with flexibility to evaluate different waste forms, disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, pathways, and scenarios. The impact of these variables on projected radiological risk can be significant. Therefore, the model was developed as a first-order assessment tool to risk-inform decision making. Refinement of the model would be necessary if it was to be used for licensing decisions, and rigorous validation would be needed. Because site-specific waste management decisions or other variables can strongly influence whether performance objectives can be met, care should be taken not to take the model results out of the analysis context.

The model was constructed with the dynamic simulation software package GoldSim®, developed by GoldSim Technology Group of Issaquah, WA. Goldsim is a Monte Carlo simulation software solution for dynamically modeling complex systems in business, engineering, and science. GoldSim is used for decision and risk analysis, by simulating future performance while quantitatively representing the uncertainty and risks inherent in all complex systems. GoldSim has been used by NRC staff to risk-inform reviews of DOE performance assessments (Esh, 2002; Esh, 2006). GoldSim is used by over 30 organizations in the field of radioactive waste management.

This report is not intended to provide full documentation of the technical analysis performed to develop the risk insights associated with DU. The report is intended to provide a summary of the analysis and resultant risk insights developed by the staff.

PROBLEM CONTEXT

The NRC LLRW regulatory program ensures the continued safe and secure LLRW disposal under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments (LLRWPA) of 1985. A primary goal of the LLRWPA is to ensure that disposal capacity would be available for all classes of LLRW generated by AEA licensees. Criteria for determining the classification of LLRW are specified in Part 61 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The original development of Part 61 did not explicitly consider a waste stream involving the large amounts of DU that has ensued from the operation of a commercial uranium enrichment facility (NRC, 1981). Therefore, the Commission directed the staff to consider whether the quantities of DU in the waste stream from uranium enrichment facilities warrant amending the waste classification tables in Part 61 (NRC, 2005). The nature of the

radiological hazards associated with DU presents challenges to the estimation of long-term effects from its disposal – namely that its radiological hazard gradually increases due to the in-growth of decay products, eventually peaking after 1 million years, rather than decreasing significantly over a few hundred years like that of typical LLW.

Characteristics of DU

Depleted uranium can have a variety of chemical and physical forms dependent on the enrichment process used. Depleted uranium is produced in the enrichment process as a waste product or byproduct. The source term results from the fact that the enrichment process concentrates both the ^{235}U and ^{234}U in the product, and therefore, these radionuclides are depleted in the waste or byproduct. Metallic DU contains approximately 99.75 percent ^{238}U , 0.25 percent ^{235}U , and 0.002 percent ^{234}U (Kozak, 1992). Depleted uranium oxide contains approximately 85 percent uranium by mass. In comparison, a low-grade uranium ore common in the United States may contain 0.1 percent uranium by mass. The most prevalent forms of DU for disposal resulting from fuel cycle activities are depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF_6) and depleted uranium oxide (UO_2 or U_3O_8), which results from deconversion of fluoride forms. Uranium oxides include UO_2 , U_3O_8 , and uranium trioxide. Both UO_2 and U_3O_8 are solids that are significantly more stable than UF_6 over common disposal conditions, making the oxide forms more suitable for long-term storage or disposal. Uranium hexafluoride reacts with water to form corrosive hydrogen fluoride (HF).

Depleted uranium contains three principal radionuclides after production: ^{238}U , ^{235}U , ^{234}U . Over time, the parent radionuclides decay through the uranium series decay chains producing daughter radionuclides. In natural ores, the daughter radionuclides are generally in secular equilibrium with the parent radionuclides. For mill tailings, a significant portion of the total activity at the time of disposal is associated with radium, therefore disposal or management decisions can focus on the radiological inventory at the time of disposal. For example, a barrier to attenuate the emanation of radon from mill tailings can be designed based on the concentration of the material at the time of disposal. On the other hand, DU is essentially depleted in the daughter radionuclides but concentrated (compared to natural ore or mill tailings) in the parent radionuclides. Over long periods of time, the uranium parent radionuclides have the potential to produce quantities of daughter radionuclides significantly in excess of natural ores or mill tailings because the DU source has much higher concentrations of uranium. For example, mill tailings commonly have from 0.004 to 0.02 wt percent U_3O_8 , 26 to 400 pCi/g ^{226}Ra , and 70 to 600 pCi/g ^{230}Th at the time of disposal (Robinson, 2004). Depleted uranium (in oxide form) would have approximately 99.9 percent uranium oxide at the time of disposal and greater than 300,000 pCi/g ^{226}Ra and ^{230}Th approximately 1 million years after disposal (values cited were calculated with a simple decay/in-growth calculation). Because the daughter radionuclides are different elements, they have different mobility in the environment than the parent radionuclides and in some cases are significantly more mobile (e.g., radon).

Figure 1 provides the ratio of the activity of DU at various times to its initial activity. For comparison, a similar ratio for a commercial LLW facility is provided based on data from Barnwell, South Carolina (Chem-Nuclear Systems, 1995). Whereas the activity in a commercial LLW facility decreases to a few percent of the initial value over a few hundred years, the activity in a facility for DU would be expected to remain relatively constant initially, but begin increasing




Figure 1 Activity Ratios of DU and a Commercial LLW Facility. The activity ratios are defined as the initial activity to the activity at various points in time.

at around 1,000 years. Peak activity, assuming no release from the source, would not be attained until after 1 million years after disposal. The ratio for DU shown in Figure 1 is determined by the number of daughter radionuclides represented in the decay chain, because the daughter radionuclides are in secular equilibrium with the long-lived parents for long periods of time. In addition, the activity of some risk significant radionuclides (e.g., ^{222}Rn , ^{210}Pb) increase by a much more significant amount than the overall activity. The activity of ^{222}Rn and ^{210}Pb in particular increase by more than a factor of 1,000 between 1,000 years to 1 million years after disposal. Because different elements can have different mobility and radiotoxicity, total activity cannot be directly translated to risk (dose). As a result of these characteristics of the source term, assessment of the risk of DU disposal in the near-surface requires an evaluation of a number of different features, events, and processes over timeframes that could be substantial.

Past Regulatory Approaches to LLW Analysis

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) (NUREG-0782), the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) (NUREG-0945), and an update to the impact analysis methodology (NUREG/CR-4370) for Part 61 provide a description of the analysis approach for evaluation of near-surface disposal of commercial LLW. These references provide a full description of the analysis approach. This section provides a summary of key aspects and assumptions for the analysis in order to provide context for the current problem.

The analysis to support development of Part 61 considered different periods of institutional control (NRC, 1981). The final regulations in 10 CFR 61.59(b) specify that institutional controls may not be relied upon for more than 100 years. At the time of development of Part 61, it was envisioned that LLW in a disposal facility would decay, in a maximum of 500 years, to activity levels that would not pose a significant risk to an inadvertent intruder, and that there would not be significant quantities of long-lived isotopes which would pose unacceptable long-term risks to the public from releases from the facility. In developing Part 61, NRC considered longer periods of institutional control in the DEIS (NRC, 1981). Assumptions about the persistence of institutional controls in the international community were considered and a series of public meetings were conducted to get input from stakeholders. The consensus among the stakeholders was that it is not appropriate to assume institutional controls will last for more than a few hundred years. The resultant regulatory framework for commercial LLW disposal assumes material that does require institutional control for much longer than 100 years to demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives would generally be determined to not be suitable for near-surface disposal as LLW. The regulatory philosophy is that the engineered and natural system should afford protection to the public, without total reliance on institutional control of the site, because of the relatively large uncertainty associated with predicting societal systems. The institutional controls allow monitoring and maintenance of the disposal facility to be completed and also restrict access to a disposal facility after closure (NRC, 1981).

The analysis for development of Part 61 applied the following assumptions with respect to receptors and eventual use of the disposal site. After the period of active institutional control ended (as discussed above), the public receptor was assumed to engage in residential, agricultural, or other activities at the boundary of the disposal site. These assumed activities were consistent with current regional practices. The disposal site included a buffer zone around the disposal area, where the disposal area circumscribed the disposal units (NRC, 1982). An appropriate buffer zone was expected to extend approximately 100 m (330 feet [ft]) from the disposal area, although buffer zones up to 1,000 m (3,300 ft) were considered. A receptor engaging in activities on the disposal site, rather than outside the buffer zone, was regarded as the inadvertent intruder. A receptor engaging in activities at the edge of the buffer zone was regarded as a member of the public. Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of the concepts considered.

The Part 61 impacts analysis was generic in nature and focused toward helping to establish generic criteria for LLW management and disposal, including developing requirements for waste classification (NRC, 1981). A fairly large number of variables were considered in the analysis, including, but not limited to: waste form and processing, disposal environment, facility design, control, and technical indices for aspects such as leachability, dispersibility, stability, and chemical content. Impacts were assessed for offsite members of the general public as well as onsite acute and chronic scenarios resulting from exposure to or disruption of the waste. Inadvertent intrusion was assumed to occur following a breakdown of institutional controls. The intruder was assumed to excavate and construct a residence on the disposal site (intruder-construction), or occupy a dwelling located on the disposal site (intruder-agriculture) and ingest food grown in contaminated soil (NRC, 1981). The intruder-agriculture scenario was assumed to be possible only if the waste had degraded to an unrecognizable form. Exposure to radionuclides through inhalation of contaminated soil and air, direct radiation, and ingestion of contaminated food and water were considered. Additional exposed waste scenarios were considered as well as other potential exposure pathways. The intruder-agriculture scenario,




Figure 2 Geometric Relationship of the Disposal Units, Disposal Area, and Buffer Zone of a Disposal Site. Adapted from the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Part 61 (NRC, 1982).

along with a 500 millirem (mrem) dose value, was used to develop the waste classification tables found at 10 CFR 61.55. Requirements for a specific intruder scenario or dose value are not found in Part 61. The use of a higher dose value for the inadvertent intruder analysis (500 mrem), compared to the value specified in 10 CFR 61.41 for the general public (25 mrem/yr), implies that the loss of institutional control by a state or federal agency was believed to be unlikely, if a similar level of protection was being afforded to a member of the public whether they were an intruder or resident receptor. The approach to developing the waste classification system was believed to provide protection of public health and safety under a variety of conditions. However, it was also recognized that unique characteristics of waste, disposal sites, and methods of disposal may lead to alternative requirements for waste classification.

The update of the Part 61 impacts analysis methodology explicitly addressed the effects of radon gas generation (NRC, 1986), which is important for disposal of DU in the near-surface. Radon was recognized to be generated in some waste streams, in which case the in-growth of radon gas in buildings was expected to be included in the intruder-agriculture scenario. The impacts analysis update provided approaches to calculate radon doses, and stated that the doses should be added to other impacts calculated for the intruder-agriculture scenario. However, the DEIS and FEIS did not envision large quantities of material that could generate radon would be disposed of as LLW. The Part 61 DEIS assumed 17 Curies (Ci) of ^{238}U and 3 Ci of ^{235}U would be disposed of in 1 million m^3 of waste over a 20-year generic LLW site operating life (NRC, 1981). The performance objectives in Subpart C of Part 61 do not provide explicit requirements for radon. Radon is discussed in NUREG-1573, *A Performance Assessment Methodology for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities: Recommendations of NRC's Performance Assessment Working Group*, as being included as part of the assessment of

gaseous releases in LLW disposal (NRC, 2000). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for uranium mill tailings (40 CFR 192) provide a ^{222}Rn release rate limit of 20 picocuries (pCi)/m²-s from the cover over the tailings and a ^{222}Rn concentration in free air (outside the site, above background) of 0.5 pCi/L. The DOE takes a similar approach to managing radon from disposal facilities, through specification of a 20 pCi/m²-s flux limit. For comparison, the mean value for atmospheric radon in the United States is approximately 0.25 pCi/L. Studies of indoor radon levels indicate an average concentration of from 1.5 to 4.2 pCi/L (Alter and Oswald, 1987; Nero et al, 1986). Daily intake of radon is generally much more significant from indoor exposure than from outdoor exposure. Indoor radon concentrations are higher because the flow rate of clean air (i.e., the exchange rate) is much lower than outdoors, and other factors. Daily intake of radon indoors is as much as ten times higher than outdoors (Cothorn et al., 1986). The flux limit standard of 20 pCi/m²-s would generally result in inhalation doses to a hypothetical resident next to the disposal facility on the same order as the 10 CFR 61.41 dose limit of 25 mrem/yr. However, the translation of a flux rate to dose is dependent on a number of site-specific and receptor scenario variables.

Period of Performance

The staff has reviewed various approaches for the period of performance under several NRC regulations. The following discussion summarizes current NRC regulatory approaches to the period of performance in waste management.

A value for the performance period is not provided in Part 61, in part due to the site-specific and source-specific influence on the timing of projected risk from a LLW facility. A performance period of 10,000 years was included in the DEIS for Part 61 (NUREG-0782). The recommended performance period by the performance assessment working group for a typical commercial LLW facility is 10,000 years (NRC, 2000). This performance period is considered to be sufficiently long to capture the risk from the short-lived radionuclides, which comprise the bulk of the activity disposed, as well as the peaks from the more mobile long-lived radionuclides, which tend to bound the potential doses at longer timeframes (greater than 10,000 years). The recommendations of the NRC's performance assessment working group, found in NUREG-1573, noted that there would be exceptions to the 10,000 year performance period recommendation. Disposal of large quantities of uranium or transuranics was one of the examples of an exception provided in NUREG-1573. The issue of the performance period was presented to the Commission in SECY-96-103. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) expressed a similar concern as the performance assessment working group. The ACNW, in a February 11, 1997, letter to the Commission, stated:

"The potential for significant quantities of certain long-lived radionuclides, such as uranium in near-surface LLW sites, is greater than was anticipated in the DEIS for 10 CFR Part 61. The result is that peak doses may not occur until a long period of time has passed, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of years. In addition, the risk from decay products may be higher than that of the parent. If the calculated doses at very long periods exceed the standard by significant factors, the LLW disposal system may require modification."

A required performance period for robust engineered barriers used in the disposal of Class C waste is specified in Part 61 as 500 years [10 CFR 61.52(a)(2)]. This performance period is necessary to ensure that the Class C waste can be protected from inadvertent intrusion until it

decays to safe levels. Class C waste can be disposed of with a robust intruder barrier or be disposed of at depths below 5 m; either measure would be protective of public health and safety (see Part 61). The performance period for engineered barriers used to limit inadvertent intrusion and demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 61.42 is not the same as the performance period for demonstration of compliance with 10 CFR 61.41, protection of the public. For example, demonstration of compliance with 10 CFR 61.41 typically involves assessment of radionuclide transport through groundwater pathways, and the associated travel time for some radionuclides is typically in excess of 500 years. The processes and pathways potentially leading to exposure to the public under 10 CFR 61.41 are typically indirect, whereas the processes and pathways leading to exposure to the public (inadvertent intruder) under 10 CFR 61.42 are direct. The peak doses for inadvertent intrusion usually occur in the year of intrusion, because commercial LLW contains a significant fraction of short-lived radionuclides, whereas the peak doses for demonstration of compliance with 10 CFR 61.41 are usually delayed as a result of transport through the environment. The performance period for engineered barriers, combined with the waste classification system, ensures that the public health and safety would be protected in the event of inadvertent intrusion into the waste.

Other waste management programs that use a period of performance include decommissioning, high-level waste (HLW) disposal, and management of mill tailings. Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20 provides that the analysis for decommissioning of sites should estimate the peak annual dose within the first 1,000 years after decommissioning. However, at most, but not all, facilities undergoing decommissioning, the quantity of long-lived radionuclides of concern are generally limited. In addition, the contamination is generally distributed in the accessible environment and the analysis for unrestricted use assumes direct land use of the contaminated site. Because there is generally assumed to be direct (inadvertent) access to the contamination, the risk from long-lived radionuclides that may have long environmental transport times is captured with the 1,000 year period of performance.

The period of performance for geologic disposal of high-level nuclear waste is based on a number of considerations, including but not limited to: sufficient period of time to ensure safety of humans and the environment for the release of radiation following loss of integrity of engineered barriers; adequate time period to incorporate significant processes and events that impose greatest risk; restricted time period during which uncertainties can be prescribed with reasonable assurance; and sufficient time such that the source term is greatly reduced and roughly equivalent to the hazard from a natural ore body (NRC, 2001). The generic (i.e., for sites other than Yucca Mountain) standards and regulations for HLW disposal (40 CFR Part 191 and 10 CFR Part 60) specify a compliance period of 10,000 years. Site-specific standards and regulations have been developed for HLW waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as directed by statute. The compliance period for Yucca Mountain was specified in EPA's standard (40 CFR Part 197) at 10,000 years. However, the compliance period was remanded on a procedural basis because the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Science (NAS) were not adequately considered as required by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The NAS stated that compliance assessment is feasible for most physical and geologic aspects of repository performance on the time scale of 1 million years at Yucca Mountain. For HLW disposal, the NAS recommended that the compliance assessment be conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs, within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the geologic environment. As a result of the remand, EPA has proposed a revised standard (i.e., different dose limit, and further constraints for performance assessment for the period beyond 10,000 years) to address the difficulties and uncertainties in conducting analyses beyond 10,000 years.

The standards for the management of uranium mill tailings in 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A, requires disposal in accordance with a design that provides reasonable assurance of control of radiological hazards for 1,000 years and, in any case, for at least 200 years. The standard also requires perpetual governmental ownership and long-term surveillance of the site (which may include monitoring as necessary). Therefore, no prolonged inadvertent access or use of the site is assumed during this period. Flux limits are applied for ^{222}Rn averaged over the cover system and standards for groundwater protection are specified. As discussed previously, two primary differences between the source terms for uranium mill tailings and DU are the concentrations of uranium and the initial and eventual concentration of daughter radionuclides. Depleted uranium has much higher initial concentrations of uranium and much lower initial concentrations of daughter radionuclides. However, the eventual concentrations of daughter radionuclides in DU will be much higher than mill tailings.

Internationally, there is no consensus on the approaches used for period of performance (NEA, 2002). Many countries consider a multi-step approach with early and longer assessment periods, although some countries do not specify a time of compliance. The NRC LLW regulations do not specify a period of performance. However, the documentation supporting the environmental impact statements for Part 61 and related guidance documents recognized the need to use a period of performance commensurate with the persistence of the hazard of the source (NRC, 1981; NRC, 1982; NRC, 2000). Selection of a period of performance generally considers the characteristics of the waste, the analysis framework (assumed scenarios, receptors, and pathways), societal uncertainties, and uncertainty in predicting the behavior of natural systems over time.

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

The primary objective of the analysis was to understand the impacts of key variables on the risks from disposing of DU as LLW such that staff could respond to Commission direction to consider whether the quantities of DU in the waste stream from uranium enrichment facilities warrant amending the waste classification tables in Part 61. Therefore, the current analysis used a framework similar to the analysis performed for the DEIS and FEIS supporting Part 61, as discussed below. Although computational tools and methods to incorporate and evaluate uncertainty have improved, and therefore, were used in the current analysis, staff believed the regulatory framework used in the development of Part 61 remains appropriate today.

Evaluation of protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity (10 CFR 61.41) was performed for leaching of contaminants to a water pathway and diffusion of radon to the atmosphere. The general population was assumed to reside offsite during the institutional control period, and then outside a buffer zone surrounding the disposal area boundary after the institutional control period. The model was structured such that the length of the institutional control period was evaluated in the analysis in order to assess the sensitivity of the results to the institutional control period. The protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion was evaluated with acute and chronic exposure scenarios following either excavation into the waste, excavation above the waste but not into the waste, or drilling through the waste. The particular intruder scenario evaluated was based on the depth to waste. Below a disposal depth of 3 m, disruption of the waste via excavation was not believed to be credible for a resident-intruder scenario. Notable differences from the analysis performed to support Part 61 were (current analysis described): probabilistic assessment of uncertainty and variability, and use of updated dose conversion factors and the International Committee on Radiation Protection (ICRP) 26 and 30 dosimetry models. Also as previously noted, the purpose of the screening analysis was

to evaluate key variables such as disposal configurations (disposal depth and barriers), performance periods, institutional control periods, waste forms, site conditions, pathways, and scenarios. Some of these variables were evaluated outside of ranges that may have been used in the LLW impacts analysis.

Key assumptions for the analysis included:

- Depleted uranium would be disposed of in an oxide form. The model included the capability to look at other forms, but those capabilities were not used in the analysis.
- Although smaller disposal quantities were evaluated, most analyses assumed approximately 300,000 m³ of DU in the fluoride form would be converted to an oxide for disposal. The quantities assumed were 700,000 metric tons from DOE and 700,000 metric tons from operation of commercial uranium enrichment facilities (DOE, 2007; NRC, 2006; NRC, 2005).
- There was no co-disposal of other waste that would impact release or mobility of the DU.
- The basic disposal configuration was placement of 200 L carbon steel packages of DU in below ground disposal cells that were backfilled with native soil.
- The disposal system was assumed to have an engineered cover that would limit infiltration (performance set by the user in the analysis).
- The disposal system was assumed to have a clay layer as a radon barrier. The thickness of the clay was assumed to be 0.5 m for the results reported in this report.
- Additional performance credit of engineered features was not assumed, given the long-timeframes evaluated and the current types of technology used in near-surface disposal. Engineered features can have a large impact on performance, but justification of that credit beyond hundreds of years can be challenging.
- The liquid saturation of various materials in the analysis was temporally-invariant, but varied stochastically with each probabilistic realization.
- After the active institutional control period, the resident receptor would be located outside a buffer zone surrounding the disposal area.
- Site stability requirements would be achieved. There will not be significant releases of waste to the environment from fluvial or aeolian erosion.
- Extreme events, such as pyrophoricity, would be avoided through disposal conditions or other requirements.
- Soil-to-plant transfer factors are valid over the range of concentrations of radionuclides projected to be released to the soil from DU.
- Radon was included in the dose assessment. The concentration of radon that a member of the public is exposed to is equal to the atmospheric concentration over the site (e.g., the site is large enough such that additional dilution during transport to a receptor located at the disposal site boundary is limited).
- Radon gas was assumed to be transported through the system by diffusion. Barometric pumping was not included. The validity of this assumption is questionable for shallow disposal depths in arid environments in particular. However, under those conditions, the doses were sufficiently large that the primary output metric of whether the system could meet the performance objectives would not be impacted (i.e., the results already exceeded the performance objectives).
- The quantity of material being disposed is sufficiently large such that lateral dispersion during transport through groundwater can be neglected.
- Colloidal transport was neglected.

MODEL DESCRIPTION

A screening model was developed as a first-order assessment tool to evaluate the radiological risk to future residents and intruders (acute or chronic exposures) near or on the land overlying a hypothetical disposal facility for DU. The model was designed to provide the user with flexibility to evaluate different waste types and forms (e.g., fluoride types, oxides types, powdered forms, and solid forms), disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, pathways, and scenarios. Refinement of the model would be necessary if it was to be used for licensing decisions, and rigorous validation would be needed. Because site-specific waste management decisions or other variables can strongly influence whether performance objectives can be met, the results should not be taken out of the analysis context.

The model was constructed with the dynamic simulation software package GoldSim®. A hierarchical design to the modeling was used with containers to organize information. At the top level, containers are provided for *Simulation_Settings*, *Materials*, *DU_Analysis_Model*, *Results*, and *Documentation*. Figure 3 provides a screen snapshot of the top level of containment for the model. For version 7.1, the model contains 3,252 GoldSim elements of 19 different types with 10 levels of containment. Stochastic inputs are specified for over 400 variables. Figure 4 provides a screen snapshot of the model structure within the *DU_Analysis_Model* container. The hierarchical design and use of submodels facilitated different team members working on different portions of the model concurrently. The arrows in Figure 4 show the flow of information between containers in the model. The time to execute 100 realizations (repetitions of a probabilistic simulation) is approximately 7 minutes on a quad core 2.66 gigahertz (GHz) personal computer with 3 gigabytes (GB) of random access memory (RAM).

Most controlling parameters for a simulation were organized in the *Simulation_settings* container. This container provides various controls such as parameters for specifying the intrusion time, waste depth, pathway settings (e.g., turn radon or groundwater on/off), and residential properties (presence or absence of a basement, location of the resident with respect to the buried source). Within the *Simulation_settings* container are containers for intruder settings, such as well properties and excavation properties, and source input settings. Source input settings are clones of other elements within the model to allow the user ease of access to change the waste form type, site environment (i.e., humid or arid), and presence of grout. Clones are duplicates of model elements that, when edited, propagate the changes to all of the associated clones.

The *Materials* container provides the species element, solubilities, solids, partition coefficients, and tortuosity calculations. The species element for this model is a vector of the radioisotopes provided in the model including their half-lives and decay chains. The current model explicitly considers 11 radionuclides, although one of the radionuclides is a dummy of ^{222}Rn used to incorporate the effect of variation in emanation, such as if the DU was grouted. The model contains seven different types of solid phases, each which can have different physical properties such as density, porosity, tortuosity, and partition coefficients. Tortuosity of the partially saturated porous media in the engineered cap is specified with one of five different methods. Particular approaches for modeling some of the technical aspects are discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs. The *Results* container provides selected outputs, such as plots of dose histories by scenario, pathway, or radionuclide.




Figure 3 Top-level Containment of the DU Analysis Model

Main submodels include inventory, source term, infiltration, radon, groundwater transport, and biosphere. Submodels use both deterministic and probabilistic input values or distributions. Submodels can be summarized as:

- The inventory model allows the user to specify the quantity and radiologic distribution of the source. The model includes ^{238}U , ^{235}U , ^{234}U and their associated decay chains. Decay chains have been simplified by including the dose contribution of short-lived daughters with the parent radionuclide using a half-life cut off of 30 days. The ^{234}U decay chain explicitly included: ^{230}Th , ^{226}Ra , ^{222}Rn , ^{210}Pb , and ^{210}Po . The ^{238}U decay chain included ^{234}U and its daughter radionuclides previously listed. The ^{235}U decay chain included: ^{231}Pa and ^{227}Ac . The decay of ^{226}Ra is fractioned to ^{222}Rn and a dummy radionuclide, ^{222}Du , to account for emanation loss of ^{222}Rn . This approach results in a decrease in the source concentration of radon, and therefore, decreases the diffusion rate of radon from the source. The fraction of ^{226}Ra that decays to the ^{222}Du is immobile as ^{222}Du . The ^{222}Du decays in place to the next member of the decay chain, thereby not impacting the groundwater pathway calculation.




Figure 4 Model Structure within the Main Model Container

- The source term submodel is used to define the quantity, type, and form of the material being disposed; its associated physical and chemical properties; and the geometry of disposal (waste thickness, depth, etc.). The source term submodel can represent the failure of waste containers over time as well as the gradual degradation of the waste form. Waste released from the waste form is available for partitioning between media and release from transport processes. The source term model applies distribution coefficients, based on material type, to partition radionuclides between solid and liquid phases. Solubility limits are also applied, in addition to partitioning, to estimate liquid phase concentrations of radionuclides. The model makes use of cloning of elements with localized containers to apply different solubility limits in different portions of the model. Localization of a container prevents the model portions outside of the container from seeing or manipulating the contents inside the container unless the user specifies otherwise. Partition coefficients are selected with multi-dimensional lookup tables based on sampled values for liquid saturation, pH, and carbonate concentration. An environmental condition switch is used to represent different site types (e.g., humid or arid) by selecting different liquid saturation, pH, and carbonate concentrations. The calculated partition coefficients from this approach were compared to literature values. Numerous references were used to develop the lookup tables and are found in the reference section of this report.
- The infiltration submodel is an abstracted representation of what are complex and dynamic physical processes; the infiltration rate is not calculated in the model but is specified by the user of the model. The user specifies the effectiveness of an

engineered cap to reduce infiltration, and how the performance of the cap decreases over time. This approach allows ease of use to evaluate a full range of infiltration scenarios. Complex infiltration rate profiles could be provided; however, the current analysis was for hypothetical sites without specific infiltration rate data or engineered cover designs. In most analyses, the infiltration cover was assumed to lose its effectiveness a few hundred years after site closure. For arid sites, the long-term infiltration rate was assumed to be on the order of a few millimeters per year. For humid sites the long-term infiltration rate was assumed to be on the order of tens of centimeters per year.

- The radon submodel is used to estimate the flux of radon into the interior of a residence placed over the disposal area or to the external environment. Radon that emanates from radium present in the DU is modeled as diffusing to the surface through an engineered cap. The engineered cap contains a clay layer as well as a soil layer. The thicknesses of the layers are specified by the user. Modeling of radon transport in partially saturated media is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. The gas phase diffusion of radon in partially saturated porous media is highly dependent on the saturation of the media. To take this into account, the tortuosity used in the diffusion calculations is corrected for the saturation of the pore space in the soil and the clay. The model allows the use of one of five different relationships between tortuosity and saturation. The outdoor concentration of radon is calculated by modeling the air above the site as a mixing cell in which the radon is diluted and removed by wind. If a residence is located over the DU disposal area, the radon is also modeled as diffusing through the foundation of the house and into the house. The indoor concentration of radon is calculated by modeling the interior of the house as a mixing cell that has inputs from the diffusive flux of radon from the subsurface and from radon that is brought in from the outdoor air through the ventilation system. Staff compared the estimated radon fluxes with values calculated using Regulatory Guide 3.64 (NRC, 1989).
- Because the assessment was designed to evaluate a range of sites, the groundwater transport modeling was relatively simple from the perspective of temporal and spatial variability. Transport through the unsaturated zone was assumed to be vertical to the saturated zone; transport through the saturated zone was assumed to be horizontal or lateral to a receptors well. Groundwater transport through the unsaturated zone is represented with a series of mixing cells. Advection, partitioning between liquid and solid phases, solubility limits, and decay and in-growth are included in the mathematical representation of a cell. Diffusion can be included in cell elements but has not been included in the current representation because advective transport of radionuclides dominates diffusive transport except under very low flow conditions. Cell elements implicitly include dispersion. Groundwater transport through the saturated zone is represented with GoldSim pipe elements. Pipes are modeled as reactive columns and include advection, partitioning between liquid and solid phases, decay and in-growth, and dispersion. Additional features are available with pipe elements, such as exchanges between immobile storage zones (e.g., matrix diffusion), that are not used in the current analysis. The flux of radionuclides from the unsaturated zone is mixed in the saturated zone based on the characteristic length of the source (the square root of the source area) and a user-defined well screen depth typically set at approximately 5 m. The flow of water entering the saturated zone pipe is based on the hydraulic gradient and hydraulic conductivity of the saturated zone. Because the analysis was generic and hydrologic systems can have widely variable properties, the input distributions were fairly

wide, resulting in hydraulic residence times in the pipe from less than ten to greater than 1,000 years.

- The concentration in media model component is used to provide the outputs of radionuclide concentrations from the source, radon, and groundwater submodels for use in the biosphere submodel to estimate radiological risk.
- The biosphere submodel utilizes the probabilistic dose model BDOSE developed for the NRC by the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (Simpkins, et al. 2007). BDOSE was verified by hand calculation and comparison to RESRAD. The submodel considers unit inputs of groundwater concentrations and estimates dose for a resident farmer or a resident gardener. Acute and chronic intruder scenarios are also considered, using inputs of actual waste concentrations with units of activity per unit volume. Exposure pathways include external exposure from surface, air, and water; internal exposure from inhalation of air; and internal exposure from ingestion of drinking water, vegetables/fruits, milk, beef, game, fish, and soil. The submodel provides flexibility in defining specific exposure pathways for each receptor type. Within BDOSE, individual receptor pathways are established by selecting to include or exclude possible pathways in a defined *Pathway vector* that defines a receptor. Potential pathway doses are stochastically evaluated for each receptor type and pathway, based on user defined ingestion, inhalation rates, and exposure time distributions. Key biosphere model settings within BDOSE are controlled by switch elements that are centrally located in a single *Controls* module. Switches and data elements were included to allow the user to control aspects of the analysis such as: the use of alternative dose coefficients (ICRP 72 or Federal Guidance Report No. 11 (EPA, 1988)) for internal radionuclide dose calculations, the time for loss of institutional controls, the model used to evaluate soil concentrations, the exposure to different types of contaminated water sources, and receptor pathway definitions. BDOSE is supplied with seven soil models that can be used to evaluate radionuclide buildup in the soil from irrigation with contaminated groundwater. These multiple models provide various considerations for deposition processes (irrigation and in-growth) and removal processes (decay, soil erosion, and leaching into deep soil). BDOSE evaluates radionuclide concentrations for several animal products including: beef, milk, poultry, eggs, fish, and game. BDOSE evaluates radionuclide concentrations for multiple vegetation types, including those used for human consumption (vegetables, leafy green vegetables, fruits, and grains), and those used for animal feed (animal specific grains and fodders). For a full description of BDOSE see Simpkins et al. (2007).

Figure 5 is a diagram of the conceptual model evaluated in the analysis, with the main elements of the problem. Figure 5 does not reflect every scenario or configuration evaluated in the analyses, but is intended to give an overview of the basic conceptual model. The dashed line on Figure 5 delineates the two primary types of receptors: resident or intruder. The DU source releases to a backfill assumed to surround the DU in the disposal cells. Radon can partition between the gas and liquid phases, and diffuse in the gas phase through clay, soil, and basement foundation layers, as applicable. Radionuclides released to the backfill are vertically transported via advection through unsaturated zone cells to an underlying aquifer, where they are transported to a receptor well. Contaminated water is then extracted and used for farming or domestic purposes. Figure 6 shows the primary transport pathways implemented in the GoldSim model. The clay, soil, and foundation elements are comprised of many GoldSim cells in order to limit numerical dispersion (not shown on the figure).




Figure 5 Conceptual Model Showing the Primary Scenarios.

KEY RESULTS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The model was used to evaluate whether large quantities of DU can be disposed of in the near-surface as commercial LLW. Key variables evaluated included: disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, waste forms, site conditions, pathways, and scenarios.

Summary Results

- Depleted uranium has characteristics that are dissimilar from commercial LLW:
 - Large percentage of the activity is associated with very long-lived radionuclides
 - Decay results in increasing hazard with time until after 1 million years, as a result of increasing concentrations (and higher mobility) of decay products
 - In-growth of significant quantities of a daughter in gaseous form (^{222}Rn)
- Estimated risks are sensitive to the performance period.
- Estimated risk from radon is sensitive to the disposal depth.
- Radon fluxes to the environment are very sensitive to the long-term moisture state of the system.
- Large uncertainties (and little available data) associated with some transfer factors for uranium daughter products.
- Estimated disposal facility performance is strongly dependent on site-specific hydrologic and geochemical conditions.
- Radon is major contributor at arid sites with shallow disposal.
- The groundwater pathway is limiting at humid sites.

- Grouting of the waste may improve the likelihood of an arid site meeting the performance objectives; however, grout may enhance the mobility of uranium in the groundwater pathway after the grout degrades.

The summary conclusions from the technical analysis are:

- Near-surface disposal (i.e., less than 30 m, as defined in Part 61) may be appropriate for large quantities of DU under certain conditions. However, unfavorable site conditions can result in the performance objectives not being met. Examples of unfavorable conditions include shallow disposal (< 3 m depth) and humid sites with a potable groundwater pathway.
- Because of the in-growth of radon and other daughter products, periods of performance of 1,000 years or less result in a significant truncation of estimated risk.
- Shallow disposal (< 3m deep) is likely to not be appropriate for large quantities of DU, regardless of site conditions. Shallow disposal may be possible if robust intruder barriers, excluding the possible excavation of DU, and a robust radon barrier that can effectively limit radon fluxes over the period of performance are installed, and their performance is justified. Small quantities (1 – 10 metric tons) could be disposed of at shallow depths.
- Depleted uranium can be disposed of under arid conditions and meet the Part 61 performance objectives for 1,000 to 1 million years performance periods, if the waste disposal depth is large, or robust barriers are in place to mitigate radon.
- Disposal under humid conditions with viable water pathways is probably not appropriate for large quantities of DU.

Detailed Results

As noted above, disposal facility performance is strongly dependent on site-specific hydrologic and geochemical conditions. There is a large amount of uncertainty in a generic assessment, such as this one, and the associated risk insights should not be interpreted as anything more than providing understanding for decision making. The assessment was designed to be a first-order evaluation of key variables, and should not be misinterpreted as providing more information than a first-order assessment. The additional challenge, from a technical perspective, is presenting the results. Site-specific hydrologic conditions such as infiltration rates, liquid saturation, hydraulic gradient, unsaturated zone thickness, hydraulic conductivities, and geochemical conditions, such as pH and carbonate, and the resultant partition coefficients and solubilities were represented in the analysis as epistemic uncertainty over a broad range of sites. In reality, many of these parameters can be constrained for a particular site and disposal system. For example, uranium solubility limits applied in this model represent dissolved concentrations for a range of environmental conditions. Primary environmental factors for uranium solubility include the reduction-oxidation potential, pH, and dissolved carbonate concentration. Reducing conditions, such as those that may be present due to cementitious phases, as in reducing grout, typically result in sparingly soluble uranium species. Solubility limits for uranium, as applied in this model, can be as low as 10^{-8} moles per liter such as may




Figure 6 Main Transport Pathways Implemented in the GoldSim Model

occur under strongly reducing conditions. In contrast, under increasingly oxidizing conditions, uranium tends to exhibit more soluble species. The solubility of uranium under oxidizing conditions can vary over a wide range of concentrations and may include unlimited solubility. In addition, the presence of complexing ligands, principally carbonates at pH ranges typical of oxidized natural waters, can influence the solubility of uranium. The model represents this uncertainty for oxidizing conditions by varying solubility limits over many orders of magnitude as a function of pH and carbonate concentration. For an arid site with oxidizing conditions, the solubility of uranium generally varied from 10^{-6} to 10^{-4} moles per liter.

A typical output that NRC staff evaluates for a probabilistic analysis is the peak of the mean dose curve. The peak of the mean dose curve is compared to the performance objective (e.g., 25 mrem/yr). In this type of analysis, the peak of the mean is not the appropriate output

Table I Percent of Probabilistic Realizations that Meet the Performance Objectives

Scenario	Performance Period (yr)	Resident ¹			Chronic Intruder ²
		Total dose	Drinking water	Inhalation	Total dose
Arid, 1 m disposal depth	1,000	100	100	100	<2
	10,000	40	90	50	0
	100,000	10	60	20	0
	1,000,000	<1	40	8	0
Arid, 3 m disposal depth	1,000	100	100	100	2
	10,000	80	90	100	0
	100,000	50	60	80	0
	1,000,000	20	40	70	0
Arid, 5 m disposal depth	1,000	100	100	100	100
	10,000	80	90	100	100
	100,000	50	60	90	90
	1,000,000	30	40	90	70
Humid, 5 m disposal depth	1,000	70	70	100	100
	10,000	0	0	100	20
	100,000	0	0	100	0
	1,000,000	0	0	97	0
Arid, ³ 5 m disposal depth, Grout	1,000	100	100	100	100
	10,000	90	90	100	100
	100,000	70	70	100	90
	1,000,000	60	60	90	80

¹ Percent of realizations that are below 25 mrem/yr total effective dose equivalent (TEDE). The resident consumes contaminated plants raised at the site, but does not consume contaminated animals. The results for the resident do not have radon diffusing into the basement, but the resident does get exposure to radon in the ambient environment while outdoors and indoors. Results are rounded to one significant figure.

² Percent of realizations that are below 500 mrem/yr TEDE. When the waste depth is greater than 3 m, the waste disruption process is through well drilling, not home excavation.

³ The performance of grout over long periods of time is very uncertain. If the initial low leachability of grouted waste can be maintained, a performance benefit can be realized.


statistic, because the mean is strongly affected by a few extreme results which would represent an unfavorable site or disposal system. It is more informative to look at the median result or the fraction of probabilistic realizations that may be above or below certain values. This information could be interpreted as reflecting the likelihood that a specific scenario or configuration could achieve a particular outcome.

Table I provides the percent of realizations that meet the applicable dose limits of 25 mrem/yr to the public and 500 mrem/yr to the intruder for a variety of scenarios and configurations. Figure 7a provides example dose plots for the resident receptor and Figure 7b provides the results for the same calculation by exposure pathway. The results shown on Figure 7b are the mean dose for each pathway. The results in Table I demonstrate that performance period, disposal depth at arid sites, and site conditions are important variables to consider for the disposal of DU. With a short performance period, many sites and disposal configurations would be able to meet the performance objectives. For an arid site, radon has not ingrown sufficiently when the performance period is short (1,000 years). For both arid and humid sites, the delay in transport is sufficient to achieve the performance objectives, except for shallow disposal. Disposal of

large quantities of DU at depths less than 3 m results in projected chronic intruder doses much in excess of 500 mrem/yr. At longer performance periods and if water from the aquifer is used for consumption or for other domestic practices, such as irrigation, disposal under humid conditions would likely not meet the performance objectives. Disposal under arid conditions can achieve the performance objectives and the likelihood of compliance is significantly improved if the disposal depth is larger.

An uncertainty analysis was performed using genetic variable select algorithms using a neural network software product, Neuralware NeuralWorks Predict® (Neuralware, 2001). For the water dependent pathways at an arid site, important parameters were the hydraulic conductivity and gradient of the aquifer, the infiltration rate, and geochemical conditions that determine sorption and solubilities. For radon at an arid site, the liquid saturation of the materials and properties of the residence and scenario, such as house height, foundation porosity, air exchange rate in the house, and fraction of time spent indoors, were most significant. For animal pathways, there is very limited data on transfer factors for some of the daughter radionuclides. Additional research may be needed to develop more robust estimates of transfer factors.

(a)



(b)




Figure 7 (a) Example of Dose Histories Generated for a Probabilistic Simulation. (b) Dose Histories for a Resident Calculation by Exposure Pathway. The lines from top (highest) to bottom are: ingestion of water, ingestion of plants, inhalation (primarily radon), direct radiation, and ingestion of soil. Shown is the mean result by pathway for 100 realizations.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU may be appropriate, but not under all site conditions. It is important to note that this same conclusion would likely be reached for the disposal of commercial LLW, if it was evaluated in this analysis. However, the types and degree of constraints would be different for disposal of large quantities of DU in the near-surface compared to typical LLW. The requirements provided in Part 61 are intended to ensure that unfavorable conditions for commercial LLW disposal will be avoided. The characteristics of DU differ from commercial LLW. As shown in Figure 1, the radiologic hazard of DU is more persistent than typical commercial LLW. It also has a much lower initial specific activity compared to its eventual specific activity, which is a problem because confidence is higher shortly after disposal that institutional controls will be maintained, engineered barriers will perform their function, and stability of the disposal site can be ensured. Therefore, whereas commercial LLW requires a greater level of protection with respect to direct radiation and impacts to workers, DU requires a greater consideration of long-term stability and isolation from the accessible environment over longer timeframes. It is recommended that large quantities of DU be disposed of at a minimum of 3 m from the current land surface, if the land surface is stable, or the future land surface as estimated by geomorphologic projections over the compliance period. Ideally, even deeper disposal depths would be favorable for mitigating long-term radon hazards associated with the disposal of DU. Site-specific hydrologic and geochemical conditions should be carefully considered in assessment of the risk impacts from the disposal of large quantities of DU in the near-surface. The uranium parents and some of the daughter products can be moderately mobile in the environment. The quantity and concentration of the source, combined with the moderate mobility, can result in it being very difficult to achieve the 10 CFR 61.41 performance objective under humid conditions, if potable aquifers or aquifers that are used for irrigation of plants for human or animal consumption are impacted. Therefore, disposal of large quantities of DU under humid conditions is not recommended.

Considering the technical aspects of the problem, the performance assessment staff recommends a performance period of 10,000 years for the analysis of DU disposal. However, analyses should be performed to peak impact, and if those impacts are significantly larger than the impacts realized within 10,000 years, then the longer term impacts should be included in the site environmental evaluation. This recommendation is consistent with previous NRC guidance found in NUREG-1573 and considers the characteristics of the DU and uncertainty in estimating societal behavior and engineered and natural system performance over very long periods of time. Uncertainty in the projected doses from factors other than the physical characteristics and transport parameters of the system likely dominate at times larger than 10,000 years. Potentially high doses relative to the performance objectives could occur within a timeframe longer than 10,000 years from the disposal of large quantities of DU. However, the majority of sites, waste forms, and disposal configurations that can meet the performance objectives at 10,000 years will continue to meet the performance objectives at longer time periods. A simple approach that should be considered to ensure the eventual risk of radon is managed is to select a waste disposal depth and cover thickness based on the projected peak in-growth of the daughter species, rather than the in-growth over the performance period.

It is essential that the site hydrology and geochemistry be well-understood, because site-specific conditions are the primary determinant of the safety of the near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU. Uranium and daughter radionuclide speciation and partitioning, as well as, radon transport in natural systems are complex processes; the analysis of the near-surface disposal of DU must adequately evaluate and manage this uncertainty. Under improper

disposal systems, configurations, or unfavorable site conditions, disposal of significant quantities of DU can exceed the 10 CFR 61.41 and 10 CFR 61.42 performance objectives by a significant margin. The analysis to assess performance of DU disposal at a particular site should be supported by as much site-specific data as practical. In particular, measurements of infiltration rates, radionuclide sorption and solubilities, radon diffusion and emanation rates, waste release rates, and soil-to-plant transfer factors can greatly reduce the uncertainty in the estimated future performance of a disposal site.

REFERENCES

- Allard, B., 'Sorption of Cs, I, and Actinides in Concrete Systems.' SKB Technical Report 84-15, Sweden. 1984.
- Allard, B., 'Chemical Properties of Radionuclides in a Cementitious Environment.' SKB Progress Report 86-09, Sweden. 1987.
- Alter, H. and R. Oswald, 'Nationwide distribution of indoor radon measurements: a preliminary database.' *J. Air Pollut. Control Assoc.* 37:227-231. 1987.
- BSC, 'Dissolved Concentration Limits of Radioactive Elements.' ANL-WIS-MD-000010 Rev 3, Bechtel SAIC Company, Las Vegas, NV. 2004.
- Chem-Nuclear Systems, 'Interim Site Stabilization and Closure Plan for the Barnwell Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility – 2005 Closure Plan.' Barnwell, SC. 2005.
- Clennell, M.B. 'Tortuosity: a guide through the maze.' in *Developments in Petrophysics*, Lovell, M.A. and P.K. Harvey (eds). Geological Society Special Publication No. 122, pp. 299-344. 1997.
- Cothorn, C., *Environmental Radon, Properties*. Cothorn C. and J. Smith, eds. Plenum Press, New York. 1987.
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 'Draft Supplement Analysis for Location(s) to Dispose of Depleted Uranium Oxide Conversion Product Generated from DOE's Inventory of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride.' DOE/EIS-0359-SA1. Office of Environmental Management. 2007.
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 'Federal Guidance Report No. 11: Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion.' EPA-520/1-88-020. September 1988.
- EPA, 'Federal Guidance Report No. 12: External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water and Soil.' EPA-402-R-93-081. September 1993.
- EPA, 40 CFR 192 'Health and Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings.' Office of the Federal Register, amended January 11, 1995.
- EPA, 'Understanding Variation in Partition Coefficient, K_d, Values.' EPA-402-R-99-004A. 1999.
- EPA 'Understanding Variation in Partition Coefficient, K_d, Values. Volume III: Review of Geochemistry and Available K_d Values for Americium, Arsenic, Curium, Iodine, Neptunium, Radium, and Technetium' EPA-402-R-04-002C. 2004.
- Esh, D.W., A. C. Ridge, and M. Thaggard, 'Development of Risk Insights for Regulatory Review of a Near-Surface Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste', Waste Management'06, Tucson, AZ, February 26 - March 2, 2006.
- Esh, D.W., K. L. Banovac, and A. H. Bradford, 'The Risks and Uncertainties Associated With High-Level Waste Tank Closure,' The Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management XXVI, Materials Research Society, Pittsburgh, PA, 2002.

Jin, Y. and W.A. Jury, 'Characterizing the Dependence of Gas Diffusion Coefficient on Soil Properties.' *Soil Sci. Soc. Am. J.*, 60:66-71. 1996.

Kozak, M.W., T.A. Feeney, C.D. Leigh, and H.W. Stockman, 'Performance Assessment of the Proposed Disposal of Depleted Uranium as Class A Low-Level Waste,' Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. 1992.

Lahvis, M.A., A.L. Baehr, and R.J. Baker, 'Quantification of Aerobic Biodegradation and Volatilization Rates of Gasoline Hydrocarbons Near the Water Table Under Natural Attenuation Conditions.' *Water Resources Research* v. 27, 753-765. 1999.

NAS, 'Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards.' National Academy of Sciences. 1995.

NEA, 'The Handling of Timescales in Assessing Post-closure Safety of Deep Geological Repositories.' Workshop Proceedings, Paris, France, April 16-18, 2002. Nuclear Energy Agency. 2002.

Nero, A., 'Indoor Concentrations of Radon-222 and its Daughters: Sources, Range, and Environmental Influences.' In: Gammage R., Kaye S., eds. *Indoor Air and Human Health*. Chelsea, MI: Lewis Publishers, Inc., 43-67. 1987.

Neuralware, NeuralWorks Predict® Product Version 2.40, Carnegie, PA. 2001.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 'Draft Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61 Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste.' NUREG-0782. Washington, DC. 1981.

NRC, 'Final Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR Part 61 Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste.' NUREG-0945. 1982.

NRC, 'Update of Part 61 Impacts Analysis Methodology.' NUREG/CR-4370, Vol.1. 1986.

NRC, Regulatory Guide 3.64, 'Calculation of Radon Flux Attenuation by Earthen Uranium Mill Tailings Covers.' 1989.

NRC, 'Staff Considerations in the Development of The Branch Technical Position for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Performance Assessment.' SECY-96-103. 1996.

NRC, 'A Performance Assessment Methodology for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities: Recommendations of NRC's Performance Assessment Working Group.' NUREG-1573. 2000.

NRC, 'Preliminary Performance-Based Analyses Relevant to Dose-Based Performance Measures for a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain.' NUREG-1538. 2001.

NRC, 10 CFR Part 61, 'Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste,' *Code of Federal Regulations*, Office of the Federal Register, January 1, 2001a.

NRC, 10 CFR Part 20, 'Standards for Protection against Radiation,' *Code of Federal Regulations*, Office of the Federal Register, January 1, 2001b.

NRC, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-05-20, Docket No. 70-3103-ML. 2005.

NRC, 'Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed National Enrichment Facility in Lea County, New Mexico, Final Report.' NUREG-1790, June 2005.

NRC, 'Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, Final Report.' NUREG-1834, 2006.

Pomeroy, P.W., ACNW, Letter to Shirley Jackson, Chairman, 'Time of Compliance for Low-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal Facilities.' February 11, 1997.

Robinson, P., 'Uranium Mill Tailings Remediation Performed by the US DOE: An Overview.' Southwest Research and Information Center, Albuquerque, NM. 2004.

Rogers, V.C. and K.K. Nielsen, 'Correlations for Predicting Air Permeabilities and ²²²Rn Diffusion Coefficients of Soils.' *Health Physics*, v. 61, 225-230. 1991.

Sheppard, M.I. and D.H. Thibault. *Default Soil Solid/Liquid Partition Coefficients, K_{ds} , for Four Major Soil Types: A Compendium.* *Health Physics*. Vol. 59. pp. 471-482. 1990.

Simpkins, A.A., et al, 'Description of Methodology for Biosphere Dose Model BDOSE.' Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses, Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio, TX. 2007.

Activity	Office/Division	FY09		FY10		FY11		FY12		FY13	
		Funds (\$)	FTE	Funds (\$)	FTE	Funds (\$)	FTE	Funds (\$)	FTE	Funds (\$)	FTE
Option 1 – Generic communication and guidance document 3.6 FTE and \$200,000	FSME/DWMEP		2.6	200,000	1.0						
	Total		2.6	200,000	1.0						
Option 2 – Rulemaking and guidance document 7.8 FTE and \$450,000	FSME/DWMEP				2.5	450,000	2.4		0.7		
	FSME/DILR						0.7		0.7		
	OIS						0.1		0.1		
	OGC						0.2		0.2		
	ADM						0.1		0.1		
	Total				2.5	450,000	3.5		1.8		
Option 3 – Classify DU and rulemaking 7.1 FTE and \$800,000	FSME/DWMEP			200,000	2.5	600,000	1.7		0.7		
	FSME/DILR						0.7		0.7		
	OIS						0.1		0.1		
	OGC						0.2		0.2		
	ADM						0.1		0.1		
	Total			200,000	2.5	600,000	2.8		1.8		
Option 4 – Revise classification tables and rulemaking 11.1 FTE and \$1,400,000	FSME/DWMEP					500,000	6.0	900,000	2.2		0.7
	FSME/DILR								0.7		0.7
	OIS								0.1		0.1
	OGC								0.2		0.2
	ADM								0.1		0.1
	Total					500,000	6.0	900,000	3.3		1.8

Depleted Uranium - Additional Options Evaluated

In addition to the options discussed in the paper, staff evaluated the possible use of 10 CFR 61.58 "Alternate requirements for waste classification and characteristics" to require that a site-specific analysis be performed prior to disposal of large quantities of DU. 10 CFR 61.58 states:

The Commission may, upon request, or on its own initiative, authorize other provisions for the classification and characteristics of waste on a specific basis, if, after evaluation of the specific characteristics of the waste, disposal site, and method of disposal, it finds reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance objectives in subpart C of this part.

10 CFR 61.58 is an exception provision that allows the Commission, either upon request or on its own initiative, to authorize alternate provisions for classification or characteristics of LLW.¹ The requirements for waste classification and characteristics are found in §§ 61.55 and 61.56, respectively.² Such alternate provisions could be authorized after an evaluation showing that the specific waste, disposal site, and disposal method being proposed would provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance objectives in Subpart C of Part 61.

Under Option 1, the staff would issue a generic communication clarifying the need to demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives prior to the disposal of large quantities of DU. Therefore, § 61.58 does not apply.

Under Option 2, which is the staff's recommended option, the staff is proposing that disposal facility licensees be required to perform an analysis in order to confirm that near-surface disposal of large quantities of DU, and other "unique waste streams," can be undertaken at specific sites in conformance with the performance objectives in Subpart C to 10 CFR part 61. This would be accomplished via rulemaking to modify 10 CFR 61.55. On the other hand, use of an exception provision like § 61.58 to *require* an additional site-specific study on certain Class A waste streams, without any associated rule change, seems inconsistent with the basic premise of an exception. Specifically, the purpose of building an exception into a generally applicable rule is to allow an activity that would not otherwise be permitted, rather than to impose an additional requirement (e.g., performance of a site-specific study) on an activity that is already permitted (e.g., near-surface disposal of Class A waste). Thus, if § 61.58 were utilized to approve an alternate classification or characteristic, such action would provide additional options for a licensee, but would not require use of a particular option. Compliance with the approved alternative would not be the only method of compliance. Therefore, if the staff intended to use § 61.58 in order to develop an alternate waste classification or alternate characteristics for a Class A waste stream such as DU, and to require licensees to conform to the alternate classification or characteristics as the sole method of

¹ 10 CFR 61.58 is analogous to 10 CFR 61.54, "Alternate Requirements for design and operations," which provides similar flexibility with regards to the technical requirements specified in §§ 61.51, 61.52 and 61.53.

² 10 CFR 61.56(a) describes minimum requirements for all classes of waste that are intended to facilitate handling at the disposal site and provide protection of health and safety of personnel at the disposal site. 10 CFR 61.56(b) provides stability requirements for Class B and C waste.

compliance in place of (as opposed to as an alternative to) the existing regulations, a rule change would be necessary.³

The staff also considered whether the Commission could, on its own initiative, undertake a site-specific analysis for large quantities of DU pursuant to § 61.58. While the language of § 61.58 certainly provides for such a Commission-initiated analysis, as discussed above, performance of such an analysis pursuant to § 61.58 alone, without an associated rule change, would not replace the existing regulations as the sole method of compliance. In addition, a Commission evaluation undertaken pursuant to § 61.58 would likely have no direct effect on Agreement State licensees, as any alternate waste classification or characteristics would need to be evaluated and authorized by the Agreement State under its analog to § 61.58 or § 61.6 (general exemption provision), neither of which are currently required for compatibility.

While ineffective for Option 2, § 61.58 could play a role if the Commission were to direct the staff to implement Option 3 or 4, depending on how DU was ultimately classified. For example, if large quantities of DU were reclassified generically as Class C or GTCC using a "reference LLW disposal site assumed to be sited in a humid eastern environment" under Option 3, NRC licensees — or the Commission itself — could use § 61.58 to provide an alternate classification after performing an evaluation showing that the specific waste, disposal site, and disposal method being proposed would provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance objectives in Subpart C of Part 61. In this example, the waste in question could then be disposed of in accordance with the general reclassification developed under Option 3 or 4 (e.g., Class C or GTCC), or in accordance with the alternate classification authorized pursuant to § 61.58. But, as described above, such a § 61.58 analysis would likely have no direct effect on Agreement State licensees, as any alternate waste classification would need to be evaluated and authorized by the Agreement State under its analog to § 61.58 or § 61.6 (general exemption provision).

³ This is consistent with the discussion of § 61.58 in NUREG-1854, "NRC Staff Guidance for Activities Related to U.S. Department of Energy Waste Determinations: Draft Final Report for Interim Use." Specifically, NUREG-1854 states:

"10 CFR 61.58 was intended to allow the NRC the flexibility of establishing alternate waste classification schemes when justified by site-specific conditions and does not affect the generic waste classifications established in 10 CFR 61.55."

Id. at 3-36 (emphasis added).

March 18, 2009

COMMISSION VOTING RECORD

DECISION ITEM: SECY-08-0147

TITLE: RESPONSE TO COMMISSION ORDER CLI-05-20
 REGARDING DEPLETED URANIUM

The Commission (with Chairman Klein and Commissioners Lyons and Svinicki agreeing) approved the staff's recommended Option 2 (rulemaking to specify a requirement for a site-specific analysis for large quantities of depleted uranium in § 61.55(a)(6) and technical requirements for such an analysis) in the subject paper as recorded in the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of March 18, 2009. Commissioner Jaczko voted for Option 3 (determine classification for depleted uranium within existing classification framework).

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote sheets, views and comments of the Commission.

Annette L. Vietti-Cook
Secretary of the Commission

Attachments:

1. Voting Summary
2. Commissioner Vote Sheets

cc: Chairman Klein
 Commissioner Jaczko
 Commissioner Lyons
 Commissioner Svinicki
 OGC
 EDO
 PDR

VOTING SUMMARY - SECY-08-0147

RECORDED VOTES

	APRVD	DISAPRVD	ABSTAIN	NOT PARTICIP	COMMENTS	DATE
CHRM. KLEIN	X				X	11/26/08
COMR. JACZKO	X				X	11/3/08
	X	X			X	3/6/09
COMR. LYONS	X				X	10/21/08
COMR. SVINICKI	X				X	12/2/08

COMMENT RESOLUTION

In their vote sheets, Chairman Klein and Commissioners Lyons and Svinicki approved the staff's recommended Option 2 and provided some additional comments. Commissioner Jaczko voted for Option 3 and provided some additional comments. Subsequently, the comments of the Commission were incorporated into the guidance to staff as reflected in the SRM issued on March 18, 2009.

Commissioner Comments on SECY-08-0147

Chairman Klein

I approve the staff's recommended Option 2 to proceed with rulemaking in 10 CFR Part 61 to specify the requirements for a site-specific analysis for the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium in a low-level waste disposal facility. I agree with the view expressed by Commissioner Lyons that there will be an eventual need to risk-inform the entire waste classification framework, and join him in encouraging the staff to request the necessary resources in a future budget to revise the existing waste classification tables for all radionuclides.

Commissioner Jaczko

I approve Option 3 (determine classification for depleted uranium within existing classification framework) and I disapprove the staff's recommendation for Option 2 (rulemaking to specify requirement for site-specific analyses for the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium). The disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium (DU) is a unique challenge because, unlike typical low-level waste, the doses increase over time rather than decrease. The technical analysis included with SECY-08-0147 indicates that additional requirements are likely needed for disposal of large quantities of DU in order to protect public health and safety; for example, increased waste disposal depth or robust radon barriers may be required. However, Option 2 does not explicitly change the classification of DU as presently provided for in 10 CFR 61.55 and therefore the waste would remain classified as Class A. I do not believe that it is logical to argue that that waste that requires additional requirements for disposal (similar to those required for Class C waste) can still be labeled as Class A waste.

I agree that the staff needs to take action with respect to disposal of large quantities of DU. A more transparent and unambiguous approach would be to classify DU within the current waste classification system. Therefore, I believe the staff should implement Option 3 and classify DU within the existing classification framework, and the waste classification tables in 10 CFR 61.55 should be revised to include depleted uranium. Regardless of what waste class the DU is determined to be through this process, the staff analysis has shown that it may still be disposed of in a manner that is protective of public health and safety under certain circumstances.

I also believe the staff should, in a future budget request, include the necessary resources to completely revise 10 CFR 61 using updated methodologies and assumptions, and taking into consideration advances and changes that have taken place in the low-level waste arena since the original 10 CFR 61 was promulgated.

I commend the staff for the thorough technical analysis that was included with SECY-08-0147 and for the comprehensive range of options that were analyzed and provided for Commission consideration.

Commissioner Jaczko - supplemental vote

In my original vote on SECY-08-0147, I approved Option 3 (determine classification for depleted uranium within existing classification framework) and I disapproved the staff's recommendation for Option 2 (rulemaking to specify requirement for site-specific analyses for the disposal of

large quantities of depleted uranium). Since that vote, which was dated November 3, 2008, more information has come to light that I would like to address in my vote.

The disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium (DU) is a unique challenge because, unlike typical low-level waste, the doses increase over time rather than decrease. The technical analysis included with SECY-08-0147 indicates that additional requirements are likely needed for disposal of large quantities of DU in order to protect public health and safety; for example, increased waste disposal depth or robust radon barriers may be required. However, Option 2 does not explicitly change the classification of DU as presently provided for in 10 CFR 61.55 and therefore the waste would remain classified as Class A. I do not believe that it is logical to argue that that waste that requires additional requirements for disposal (similar to those required for Class C waste) can still be labeled as Class A waste.

The work of analyzing DU in a manner similar to the analysis done for other radionuclides has already been done in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for 10 CFR 61 (NUREG-0782, Vol. 2). Table 7.2, Waste Classification Table, of the DEIS presents concentration values for various radionuclides for determining classification. This table gives a value of $0.05 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{cm}^3$ for depleted uranium. In other words, DU that is above concentrations of $0.05 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{cm}^3$ would not be considered Class A. In addition, staff has indicated that the previous analysis done to obtain the value of $0.05 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{cm}^3$ in the DEIS likely did not include what may be a significant contribution from radon, which may require that the limit should be even lower. The concentrations of DU that will be produced by the commercial enrichment facilities is expected to be approximately $0.5 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{cm}^3$, which is ten times higher than the value given for the limit for Class A for DU in the DEIS. I do not believe that these facts should be ignored.

Although the value for depleted uranium was not subsequently carried forward into the final tables in 10 CFR 61, this was a policy decision, made simply because "[A]nalysis of the data bases for the Part 61 EIS indicates that the types of uranium-bearing wastes being typically disposed of by NRC licensees do not present a sufficient hazard to warrant limitation on the concentration of this naturally occurring material." The staff explicitly excluded from its analysis any consideration of depleted uranium from uranium enrichment facilities, which at the time were owned by the Federal government. However, now that large-scale commercial enrichment will be taking place, this type of waste does need to be considered and should not be allowed to fall through the loophole given by 10 CFR 61.55(a)(6).

I agree that DU is a low-level waste, and I understand that some people may be concerned that this waste may be orphaned if it is decided that this waste stream is not Class A. I also understand that the staff recommendation would require that a site-specific analysis would be required for disposal of large quantities of DU and this is meant to protect public health and safety regardless of what class the waste is designated. It is important to note that a site-specific analysis does not guarantee that the waste will not eventually end up orphaned regardless; for example, if a site-specific analysis shows that the DU would need to be disposed of at least 8 meters below ground, a disposal facility may not be willing or able to do so.

In summary, I do not believe the Commission should undermine the entire waste classification system, which is designed in such a way that Class A waste is meant to be that waste that poses the least hazard and requires the fewest restrictions on waste form and disposal. DU certainly does not fit this description.

I continue to believe the staff should, in a future budget request, include the necessary resources to completely revise 10 CFR 61 using updated methodologies and assumptions, and

taking into consideration advances and changes that have taken place in the low-level waste arena since the original 10 CFR 61 was promulgated.

Commissioner Lyons

I approve the staff's recommended Option 2 to proceed with rulemaking in 10 CFR Part 61 to specify the requirements for a site-specific analysis for the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium in a Low-Level-Waste disposal facility and to include the technical requirements for such an analysis. I would like to thank the staff for its thorough technical analysis and for working closely with the Agreement States during development of the Commission Paper.

Additionally, recognizing the eventual need to risk-inform the entire waste classification framework to address wastes from further facilities, I encourage staff to consider in a future budget request the necessary resources to revise the existing waste classification tables for all radionuclides, not just for DU. As staff has noted, this revision would involve different methodologies and assumptions than the original Part 61 methodology for key variables, such as: disposal configurations, performance periods, institutional control periods, waste forms, site conditions, exposure pathways, and receptor scenarios, thus, requiring additional time and resources.

Commissioner Svinicki

I approve Option 2 (rulemaking to specify a requirement for a site-specific analysis for large quantities of depleted uranium and technical requirements for such an analysis) as recommended by staff. I also approve the development by staff of a guidance document for public comment that outlines the parameters and assumptions to be used in preparation of such site-specific analyses.

Staff's parametric analysis of the disposal of "large" quantities of DU concluded that disposal facility performance is strongly dependent on site-specific hydrologic and geochemical conditions. In light of this, the requirement for a site-specific analysis as proposed in Option 2 will provide the consideration of long-term stability and isolation from the accessible environment of the associated source term over the longer timeframes relevant in this case.

I join the Chairman and my fellow Commissioners, however, in noting that a comprehensive revision to risk-inform 10 CFR Part 61 using updated assumptions and referencing the latest ICRP methodology – while undoubtedly resource intense – is likely due and should be proposed in future budgets. Finally, I also join my colleagues in thanking the staff for the analysis of depleted uranium disposal which accompanied the paper and proved quite useful in scoping the issue and assessing the proposed options.

March 18, 2009

MEMORANDUM TO: R. W. Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations

FROM: Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary */RA/*

SUBJECT: STAFF REQUIREMENTS – SECY-08-0147 – RESPONSE TO
COMMISSION ORDER CLI-05-20 REGARDING DEPLETED
URANIUM

Previously, in the adjudicatory proceeding for the Louisiana Enrichment Services (LES) license application, the Commission determined that depleted uranium is properly classified as low-level radioactive waste. Although the Commission stated that a literal reading of 10 CFR 61.55(a)(6) would render depleted uranium a Class A waste, it recognized that the analysis supporting this section did not address the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium. Outside of the adjudication, the staff was tasked to evaluate this complex issue and provide specific recommendations to the Commission. SECY-08-0147 is the result of the Commission's direction and provides recommendations for a path forward.

As an initial approach to addressing this complicated issue, the Commission has approved the staff's recommended Option 2 to 1) proceed with rulemaking in 10 CFR Part 61 to specify a requirement for a site-specific analysis for the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium (DU) and the technical requirements for such an analysis; and 2) to develop a guidance document for public comment that outlines the parameters and assumptions to be used in conducting such site-specific analyses.

In revising 10 CFR 61.55(a)(6) in this limited scope rulemaking, the Commission is not proposing to alter the waste classification of depleted uranium. Eventual changes to waste classification designations in the regulations must be analyzed in light of the total amount of depleted uranium being disposed of at any given site. However, the Commission is stating that for waste streams consisting of significant amounts of depleted uranium, there may be a need to place additional restrictions on the disposal of the depleted uranium at a specific site or deny such disposal based on unique site characteristics and those restrictions should be determined by a site specific analysis which satisfies the requirements of the proposed new 61.55(a)(9). This thought should be clearly indicated in the proposed rulemaking package seeking public comment. As part of this rulemaking, the staff should promptly conduct a public workshop inviting all potentially affected stakeholders, including licensees, state regulators and federal agencies. At this workshop, the staff should discuss the issues associated with the disposal of depleted uranium, the potential issues to be considered in rulemaking, and technical parameters of concern in the analysis so that informed decisions can be made in the interim period until the rulemaking is final.

As a longer term action, in a future budget request the staff should propose the necessary resources for a comprehensive revision to risk-inform the 10 CFR Part 61 waste classification framework, with conforming changes to the regulations as needed, using updated assumptions and referencing the latest International Committee on Radiation Protection methodology. As part of this effort, staff should also identify any corollary or conforming legislative changes necessary to support this rulemaking, if any, as well as recommendations on how to proceed absent such legislation being enacted and other agencies that may be impacted by any changes. This effort should explicitly address the waste classification of depleted uranium. In addition, this effort should include the performance of a technical analysis for public comment concerning the disposal in a near surface facility of any long-lived radionuclide, including uranium. This analysis and the resulting comments should inform the staff's eventual recommendation to the Commission on an appropriate generic requirement addressing such disposals.

cc: Chairman Klein
Commissioner Jaczko
Commissioner Lyons
Commissioner Svinicki
OGC
CFO
OCA
OPA
Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ASLBP (via E-Mail)
PDR

VII. Other Division Issues

- a. Introduction of new Board Member: Colleen Johnson
(Board Information Item)
- b. Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for the period 7/1/09
thru 6/30/10 **(Board Action Item)**